https://www.vlcdownload.com
https://www.vlcdownloads.com
https://www.videolan.com
https://www.vlc.com
https://www.downloadvlc.com
https://www.videolan.org
https://www.videolan.co.uk
https://sourceforge.net/projects/vlc/
In linux/Mac, I can "sudo apt install vlc", "sudo yum install vlc", or "sudo brew install vlc". I know I'm getting a valid and good software delivery. It just works. No malware. No sketchy websites. No malware packages.On Windows, well, you feelin lucky?
apt-get install wine
Did you just get Wine from upstream? The answer is no and this has wasted significant amounts of time of Wine developers in the past. I used to be one and spent way too many free evenings and weekends debugging subtle crashes reported by users, that turned out to be packaging bugs introduced by men-in-the-middle.
Lots of other Wine devs had the same experience, so at that time we had a policy that if someone reported a bug the first instruction was to uninstall their distro package and to install the binary packages produced by the Wine project itself. Sometimes users were upset by this advice, but it resolved a significant number of "bugs" that were being added by the distributors.
Doesn't chocolatey fit the bill?
But there are package managers for Windows, aren't there?
Microsoft even has its own app store, that you need to use to install applications such as Windows Terminal.
People often install software on Linux and macOS by downloading installers using a browser. In fact, that's how non-bleeding edge versions of Xcode are installed.
choco install vlcFor lesser known projects I just cross my fingers, but typically lesser known projects are less likely to have malware posing as them
Chocolatey does have it's quirks though, there is both a '7zip' and a '7zip.install' package, it's not intuitive what the difference is.
Actually, binary package managers are arguably strictly less safe than getting the binaries directly from upstream because you've just introduced a (literal) "man in the middle", who might have their own agendas and their own need to monetize. Like, for example ... SourceForge did. In a different context these MITM attacks can go wrong even when they're genuinely trying to be helpful, as we may remember when Debian accidentally patched out important code from a core encryption library and caused everyone to get the same SSH keys.
Generally for security you want to reduce the number of middlemen who can tamper with things, unless those middlemen are explicitly adding some sort of security value by pre-tasting the apps. So, Apple app reviewers: yes. Linux distro maintainers: sorta sometimes. Homebrew, winget etc: no. It's all automated.