Re:Arbitrary file write vulnerability in GNU gzip's zgrep ut...
by belltaco on Monday April 18, 2022 @04:49PM
(#31076329)
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Re:Arbitrary file write vulnerability in GNU gzip's zgrep ut...
by pixl97 on Monday April 18, 2022 @05:05PM
(#31076545)
I'm sure there's a lot of linux closed source utilities that will break in the same or worse manners. The problem will never be found there.
The issue with finding flaws in source is it takes a massive amount of logical thought about what inputs are possible. For example a new line is valid in a linux file name, but I've never legitimately used one, or do I believe I've even seen one in the last 25 years of using Linux.
Re:Arbitrary file write vulnerability in GNU gzip's zgrep ut...
by scottlamb on Monday April 18, 2022 @05:18PM
(#31076688)
> For example a new line is valid in a linux file name, but I've never legitimately used one, or do I believe I've even seen one in the last 25 years of using Linux.
Likewise. I wonder if SELinux or AppArmor or the like allows setting a policy for valid filenames to create. E.g. no newlines, only valid UTF-8, only printable characters.
Re:Arbitrary file write vulnerability in GNU gzip's zgrep ut...
by zeroimpl on Monday April 18, 2022 @07:30PM
(#31078051)
Iād like to see a flag somewhere to enable this. Perhaps it is a filesystem flag, similar to case-sensitivity.
Re:Arbitrary file write vulnerability in GNU gzip's zgrep ut...
by eichin on Monday April 18, 2022 @06:20PM
(#31077361)
I've seen them (specifically, filenames generated from values in a "modern" configuration language - json or yaml - that mistakenly had newlines in them.) Fortunately, most of the shell tools involved used `-print0` and the related options anyway (because once you have humans involved, it's the easy way to handle normal spaces in names) and the things that did break, where only "some low-value data processing got skipped" rather than anything harmful.