I said this below but I don't think Dodge v. Ford is particularly really plays much into modern case law outside of the judgement rule. To my knowledge, it's never been cited in Delaware (against the board at least).

A case that stands out more to me (being both more modern as well as at the federal level) is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby: "While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so." in reference to furthering religious goals instead of profit. (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/682/#tab-opi...)

I hear what you are saying. Hobby Lobby is an important case but to me Hobby Lobby doesn't really implicate the same policy concerns. Hobby Lobby was a closely held (read family held) private corporation. I agree that the language is dramatic, but I don't really think it the case has much to say about the duty to maximize shareholder value in widely held or public companies.

I read that quote from Hobby Lobby as saying "Sure, where you own the whole thing you can do what you want, whatever, it's not like you are hurting any other shareholders" but I would hesitate in relying on getting that type of language in other fact patterns.

Note that the plaintiff in Hobby Lobby was the secretary health - not a disgruntled shareholder.

Edit: a word

> have a duty to maximize shareholder value

Not to maximize profits. Courts give companies a wide berth in defining shareholder value.

Right, though I don't think it is so vague as to be meaningless. The stakeholder / shareholder value debates in corporate governance play on the extremities of this distinction a lot, with the current koan being that what is good for stakeholders is good for shareholders.

> don't think it is so vague as to be meaningless

It's not, particularly in the context of takeover defenses. There were cases in the 80s where Delaware ruled that only shareholder interests--not all stakeholders'--can be considered when a Board uses its "business judgment" to deploy a poison pill. But shareholders can have aims other than maximizing profit, and companies are free to respond to them.

Right, though it is an interesting question of whether those values either have to be (1) directly fiducial (2) couched in some theory of fiducial return or (3) can be entirely non-fiducial. Doesn't really mean much in practice because management can always just cover their ass by saying that the other aims are also good for the bottom line - even if it is nonsense.

you're confused. It's not the law that said boards have duty to maximize shareholder value, it was Jack Welch, gone but not soon enough.