While I tend to agree, reading through the various nuclear close calls as far as I can tell, there were far more on the Russian side than the American one, and while American nuclear incidents tended to be headed off with everyone following orders and working within established systems, Russian ones usually involve one guy literally refusing an order. It's hard to know how accurate all of this is, but it does imply deterrent through incompetence. The concern is not limited to intentional nuclear strikes, every time Russian forces get put on alert the threat of an accident grows. Putin likely knows this, and NATO is also very wary of it.

> if you look how poorly his troops are doing in Ukraine

s/are doing/have done/

History is replete with completely incompetent offenses that were highly useful and motivating learning experiences.

I'm not sure that Russia is culturally in a position to be their own schoolmaster here, but they could be. And they have virtually infinite domestic capacity to churn out, man, and power last-gen war materiel, even with sanctions.

Only time will tell. Nobody knows anything yet.

Their war equipment is not "last-gen", they basically keep upgrading whatever was left of the USSR and they do sit on the huge stocks of non-modernized Soviet equipment, but eventually they will be left with a useless old and vulnerable hardware. Yes, they made some next-gen tanks and planes which are not combat ready yet but modern Russian industrial capability would be able to churn out only token numbers of those anyway, under sanctions and brain drain.

Russian equipment loss in this war won't be replaced for decades if not longer.

What will the US, UK and France do if Russia uses a tactical nuke in Ukraine? Nuking Russia because they nuked Ukraine is… very unlikely.

A ton of countries would join NATO ASAP (if allowed in, and several would be) or rush to form new collective defense coalitions that include at least one other nuclear power, which in many cases would likely come with significant concessions to that nuclear power (i.e. China gains a de facto, if smallish, empire overnight).

Everyone refuses to trade with Russia until they're reduced to one of the most miserable countries on the planet. If their nuke program falls apart, several countries take some territory from them and no-one minds. Possibly they're reduced to selling parts of the country (maybe on a lease-like arrangement, which isn't unprecedented) in exchange for re-opening limited trade with countries that are willing, but see that they really have them over a barrel (China, again, is a likely beneficiary)

Several countries start or re-prioritize nuclear programs. Turkey, Iran, South Korea, and maybe even Japan, all likely candidates. Maybe more.

That's roughly what I'd expect the world to do about it, if the result isn't a spiral into outright nuclear war, or a swift and decisive coup in Russia. No, it's not good, but it's especially not good for Russia.

That’s not what nuclear deterrence protects against. If he does that there will be other forms of escalation. A Iran/North Korean style set of economic sanctions possibly (I don’t think India and China would support Putin anymore at that point). Possibly a direct confrontation over Ukraine (no fly zone or a no fly zone by proxy, giving the Ukrainians the missile defence sufficient to clear the sky). Etc.

> You should look at it from Putin's point of view. Escalating with the west is even less of an option.

I see this differently.

My understanding of the Russian "heartland" narratives suggest Russia is dead if they cannot control Ukraine in the medium term. Their "multi polar" view suggests that they MUST be at the centre of an anti-US alliance extending across Asia, Europe and Africa.

From these perspectives they HAVE to fight this war now. Even if they lose now, they feel they have to keep trying.

You assume same value system on Putin side as you have and that is unlikely.