Drivers are the commercial case for Fuschia. But in general, microkernels make it much easier to 1) implement privilege isolation for subsystems and 2) implement subsystems in a more secure manner, both of which absolutely improve security posture. A subsystem is just another type of driver. Though, it depends on how well Zircon makes use of this--i.e. avoids implementing all the most critical subsystems in the same process, or otherwise abuses too much unprotected memory sharing among them.
> 1) implement privilege isolation for subsystems and 2) implement subsystems in a more secure manner, both of which absolutely improve security posture.
Sure, but Android already has that via a user per application for app sandboxing & a very extensive selinux policy set[1]. Which makes the real-world benefit of that seemingly very negligible. There's a huge gap between desktop Linux & Fuschia/Zircon here, but there doesn't seem to be a particularly big gap between Fuschia/Zircon & Android Linux.
1: See all the .te files in the public & prive dirs of https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/maste...
We're exclusively talking about the kernel+drivers here. User land exploits are irrelevant (and obviously not something fuchsia will be immune to).
> Unless you're referring to remote code execution
I'm referring to exploits that actually are found in the wild to have caused damage that a change in kernels would have done something to prevent.