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Re:A Closer Look at the Lapsus$ Data Extortion Group by sobkas on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @08:07PM (#30785120)
> It's all been social engineering. Are you saying the software developers should have programmed all the humans in these organizations better?

They should have used login mechanism that didn't failed so spectacularly as passwords. Anything that forces server to prove its identity to client, should be a good start.

Re:A Closer Look at the Lapsus$ Data Extortion Group by otterley on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @09:30PM (#30785563)
According to the Microsoft analysis of LAPSUS$, they are able to breach MFA-protected accounts as well, through various techniques.

https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-...

Re:A Closer Look at the Lapsus$ Data Extortion Group by sobkas on Thursday March 24, 2022 @09:55AM (#30789789)
>Multifactor authentication (MFA) is one of the primary lines of defense against DEV-0537. While this group attempts to identify gaps in MFA, it remains a critical pillar in identity security for employees, vendors, and other personnel alike. See the following recommendations to implement MFA more securely

Ah, MFA because bolting more passwords(things user knows and by knowing is able to prove his identity) on top of first one is a great idea. I'm sure no bad actor will try to get this information too.

MFA might or might not authenticate server. And relaying on user action for security is asking for problems. Does user is a security expert to be able to choose appropriate action? Because sometimes even security experts get phished.

I'm thinking about something simple, that have minimal user interactivity. Something like WireGuard, but not with random keys in plain text. There are ways to prove identity/exchange keys without directly using private keys.

Something like tpm/yubikey.

Re:A Closer Look at the Lapsus$ Data Extortion Group by libraryatnight on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @09:57PM (#30785686)
Low to mid-tier support agents are being targeted directly. Sometimes they get phished (yes people will give you MFA codes and authorize push notifications if asked), sometimes they get social engineered, and sometimes they just solicit and pay them. Not just speaking of LAPSUS$ here.
Re:A Closer Look at the Lapsus$ Data Extortion Group by waste_monk on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @10:41PM (#30785907)
Maybe Okta should have installed Duo or some other MFA solution :^)