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Re:Okta’s Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise by bytelines on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @01:36AM (#30775314)
> This is an application built with least privilege in mind

Uh huh, makes sense

> Named SuperUser

Uhh...

It lists all the operations that it can't do, but not what it can do. Can they download a private SAML certificate? Can they impersonate a user? Can they configure SSO and MFA settings? Can they download audit logs?

Re:Okta’s Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise by tgsovlerkhgsel on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @02:50AM (#30775703)
> Can they download a private SAML certificate?

Oh, that's a good one. Definitely something that the software should not allow, because I can't see a legitimate reason for this (allowing to download the certificate is fine, but not the key).

Re:Okta’s Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise by bostik on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @04:06AM (#30776151)
This was my topmost question too. The report very cleanly omits any and all mentions of SAML signing certificates.

Solar Winds was the first known incident to escalate to so called "Golden SAML" attack. If the support staff had access to signing certificates, then that would open the door to a wide-scale exploitation of Okta's clients.

A shower of Golden SAMLs, if you like.

Re:Okta’s Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise by zaroth on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @06:02AM (#30776818)
Caution to fellow readers: Put down your drink before reading the last line of this post.