Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$
by Consultant32452 on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:07PM
(#30770132)
The LAPSUS$ post suggests that they queried the AWS keys out of Slack. So the support engineers just have access to Slack, and Okta engineers were dumb enough to put those keys in Slack.
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I'm incredulous an auth focused company would do this without someone freaking out? Even my much smaller SaaS companies would react quickly to stop and rotate these if this happened.
The things that go on at small SaaS companies would horrify many. One SaaS company I worked for had a "god-mode" password hard coded into the source
code. It was visible in plain text in the source, and you could login as any customer if you knew this master password. Of course, this was not logged anywhere. When employees left, they'd change the password and deploy a new build.
looking closely at that I'm suspicious that lapsus$ is playing up what were perhaps trivial or ephemeral keys that were non-sensitive ... eg: test / dev / debug instances etc.
The reason I think that is because if they really had keys for production machines it seems very unlikely they wouldn't have used them to produce some more damaging collateral than they've presented.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$
by twistedpair on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @08:29PM
(#30773392)
DPL scanners in Slack, anyone? Figured Okta would definitely have those.
We get alerts when folks are sharing tutorial code with fake keys like DEADBEEF in them. It's nice to know DPL works, if you use it.