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Re:Podman can transfer container images without a registry by denysvitali on Tuesday March 15, 2022 @02:48AM (#30682329)
Isn't this reinventing the wheel somehow? Linux distros have been using tar.gz over HTTP (not S!) and relying on GPG for years.
Re:Podman can transfer container images without a registry by ibotty on Tuesday March 15, 2022 @04:07AM (#30682765)
But most Linux distros are not that great either. They don't implement TUF and are not safe against some vectors prevented by that. It's OK to start anew when container distribution poses a different problem anyway.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Update_Framework_(TUF)

Re:Podman can transfer container images without a registry by krageon on Tuesday March 15, 2022 @04:38AM (#30682943)
The linked page doesn't explain anything at all. It says some incredibly obvious things (remotes can be compromised and you should be prepared for that) and then goes on to say the subject fixes all that, but there's actually no explanation of how it does that or what it does to get there. It's a marketing piece, essentially.
Re:Podman can transfer container images without a registry by westurner on Tuesday March 15, 2022 @12:18PM (#30687197)
From this about DNSSEC and software supply chain security a couple weeks ago, from this about Android packages: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27700513 :

>> [...] Sigstore is a free and open Linux Foundation service for asset signatures: https://sigstore.dev/what_is_sigstore/

>> The TUF Overview explains some of the risks of asset signature systems; key compromise, there's one key for everything that we all share and can't log the revocation of in a CT (Certificate Transparency) log distributed like a DLT, https://theupdateframework.io/overview/

>> Certificate Transparency: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency

>> Yeah, there's a channel to secure there at that layer of the software supply chain as well.

>> "PEP 480 -- Surviving a Compromise of PyPI: End-to-end signing of packages" (2014-) https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/

>>> Proposed is an extension to PEP 458 that adds support for end-to-end signing and the maximum security model. End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and developers to sign for the distributions that are downloaded by clients. The minimum security model proposed by PEP 458 supports continuous delivery of distributions (because they are signed by online keys), but that model does not protect distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised. In the minimum security model, attackers who have compromised the signing keys stored on PyPI Infrastructure may sign for malicious distributions. The maximum security model, described in this PEP, retains the benefits of PEP 458 (e.g., immediate availability of distributions that are uploaded to PyPI), but additionally ensures that end-users are not at risk of installing forged software if PyPI is compromised.

>> One W3C Linked Data way to handle https://schema.org/SoftwareApplication ( https://codemeta.github.io/user-guide/ ) cryptographic signatures of a JSON-LD manifest with per-file and whole package hashes would be with e.g. W3C ld-signatures/ld-proofs and W3C DID (Decentralized Identifiers) or x.509 certs in a CT log.

> FWIU, the Fuschia team is building package signing on top of TUF.

W3C Web Bundles + Linked Data for the SBOM and metadata could be a good solution for software supply chain security in general: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29296573 :

>> Web Bundles, more formally known as Bundled HTTP Exchanges, are part of the Web Packaging proposal.

https://web.dev/web-bundles/

>> HTTP resources in a Web Bundle are indexed by request URLs, and can optionally come with signatures that vouch for the resources. Signatures allow browsers to understand and verify where each resource came from, and treats each as coming from its true origin. This is similar to how Signed HTTP Exchanges, a feature for signing a single HTTP resource, are handled.

Re:Podman can transfer container images without a registry by westurner on Tuesday March 15, 2022 @04:44PM (#30691405)
How do these newer potential solutions compare to distributing packages and GPG-signed hash manifests over HTTP, with GPG public keys retrieved over HTTPS (HKP)? (Maybe with keys pinned in the GPG source codes for common key servers? Or why not?)

Are DNS (DNSSEC, DoH, DoT downgrade attacks), CA compromise (SPOF), and x.509 cert forgery still the significant potential points of failure? What of that can e.g. Web3 solve for?