News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by yuliyp on Saturday February 26, 2022 @08:39PM (#30484439)
This feels very broken:

- The suggestion of signing the timestamp means that any web site you log into with this can log in as you to any other web site you log in to

- Given that there's no namespacing of the signed messages, users can be easily phished into providing a response to a challenge posed by a different web site

- It's not obvious what advantages this has over using client cert authentication with TLS, and it has many downsides.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by hn_throwaway_99 on Saturday February 26, 2022 @09:31PM (#30484757)
> Given that there's no namespacing of the signed messages, users can be easily phished into providing a response to a challenge posed by a different web site

This is key. The whole benefit of hardware token-based authentication is that it is resistant against phishing (because SMS 2-factor and TOTP, e.g. Google Authenticator, are NOT phishing resistant).

So this approach is more complicated than those other 2 2FA approaches but with no additional security benefit.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @01:56AM (#30486044)
As the other commenter said, this has nothing to do with hardware tokens. This has to do with the user agent (the browser) passing the (browser-verified) origin to the authenticator (which can be hardware or software). But, critically, the signatures are also origin-scoped—the message that your user-agent correctly passes to google.com cannot be used by google to sign into microsoft.com.

What’s broken here is not that user agents are or aren’t validating the origin (or relying party)—it’s that the same key+challenge is used for every origin. (As a result, there’s nothing for the user agent to validate, because the same signature is used for all origins!)

It’s like using the same password for every website you log into. As severe understatement, this is a very, very bad protocol design, and nobody should use it.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by gruez on Saturday February 26, 2022 @11:35PM (#30485444)
>The whole benefit of hardware token-based authentication [...]

Technically it's not something limited to hardware tokens. You can conceivably do something similar with username/password authentication, as long as the credentials are sent to the browser and not the site.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by _wldu on Sunday February 27, 2022 @02:43AM (#30486244)
This is not meant for SSO.

Signatures are only valid for about 30 - 60 seconds (depending on the server config) and may not be re-used after a successful login. Try to create a key pair and log into the test website. Then try to use the same signature to do so again.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @02:48AM (#30486267)
It might help if you described a bit more explicitly your problem statement, threat model, and goals.
Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by _wldu on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:17AM (#30486386)
The demo website and the github repo contain this information. It would be helpful, if people actually created a key pair and tried to use it and misuse it before being critical.

It's not meant for federation, single-sign on (which is single compromise IMPO) or anything that is commonly discussed in the security community. It's foreign to most (I understand that), and I just wanted to share it and start a discussion.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:22AM (#30486406)
I read the github readme. It doesn't explain the problem or threat model in any detail.

My comment has nothing to do with federation or SSO, so I'm not sure why you mentioned those?

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by _wldu on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:46AM (#30486500)
Because it was in reply to my earlier comment saying this is not SSO. People seem to think these signatures can be used on multiple websites (sign in with Google like functionality). That's not the case.

These signatures are meant to be used to authenticate to a website. If multiple websites implement this idea, then end users should have multiple key pairs (one for each site). So there would be no way a signature for one site could be misused or abused on another.

I believe the github site and the demo website do describe the problem and goals. Webauthn is too complex. Passwords are bad. Hashes are dumped from databases and cracked. Passwords are stuffed, etc. The complexity of webauthn is not the answer.

In this scheme, the website only knows its users' public Ed25519 keys. These keys are harmless and it does not matter if they are stolen (they cannot be used to cause any harm).

The users are in full control of the keys. There is no CA signing TLS certs, etc. The web service and its users are in full control of the process and they are using open-source software. Full transparency that is easily understood by all parties.

Also, there is no identifying information in an Ed25519 key. One goal I have is user anonymity. This scheme allows for that too. No email, phone, etc. Just a public Ed25519 key fully controlled by its end user.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by Zamicol on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:33PM (#30492207)
Are you the author? If so I would love to talk with you more about your vision and goals.

I personally would like reusable keys, and I agree namespace or some other mechanism is needed.

I generally prefer to link my identity among websites and I'm generally not concerned about anonymity or privacy. "A key for each website" is nearly worthless to me.

The ability of others to spoof my identity because a website uses passwords, and most websites provide little to no logging, let alone a standardization, infuriates me. That is a outsized use case I see little attention given to.

If I tweet, users are forced to trust Twitter's authentication system that I tweeted. I don't trust Twitter's authentication systems.

Public key authentication permits third parties to verify my actions without the need to trust system authentication systems.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by dcow on Sunday February 27, 2022 @05:08PM (#30493161)
I too am interested in the small slice of the problem that is replacing passwords with something asymmetric. The rest is kinda out of scope IMO. OPAKE is cool but definitely not less complicated than WebAuthn and doesn't do anything related to solving phishing and tracking etc. either. Keys seem like a natural solution. WebAuthn is actually really good but browsers don’t yield enough control for people to use it in a portable identity style, which I also agree isn't the devil.
Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:58AM (#30486545)
WebAuthn is "too complex" the way a catalytic convert is "too complex." If you don't know what it's for, it certainly seems like you can remove it with no downsides. ;)

> Because it was in reply to my earlier comment saying this is not SSO.

The person you were replying to was also not talking about SSO, which makes me think you don't understand that (valid, and fundamental) criticism of your proposal. :-/

> Webauthn is too complex.

Which functionality would you remove, and what tradeoffs does that get you?

> Passwords are bad. Hashes are dumped from databases and cracked.

Surely it's easier for an IdP to use scrypt with some meaningful salt than to implement this fully novel and unsupported scheme.

> Passwords are stuffed, etc.

These seem like problems that affect password reuse. According to your design, users should just know better than to reuse keys, so...why not just know better than to reuse passwords?

> There is no CA signing TLS certs, etc.

So why not use self-signed X509 client certs instead? This is actually a thing browsers actually support.

> The web service and its users are in full control of the process and they are using open-source software.

This is a category error. We were discussing a protocol. If you think your specific implementation of that protocol is better than all the open source implementations of FIDO+WebAuthn, X509 client certs, PAKE, etc...well, you're probably wrong. :)

> One goal I have is user anonymity.

You have not explained how your system is more anonymous than the existing, well-defined, standards-compliant alternatives.

Edit: Just to be clear about the tone of my feedback: my intention is to help you understand the context in which you are making your proposal and, ideally, understand the design tradeoffs existing systems have made. I know it's easy to become attached to an idea and take criticism like a personal attack. I hope you can take this constructively.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by dcow on Sunday February 27, 2022 @09:13AM (#30488584)
Your tone is overly dismissive. If you want to be constructive then have a constructive conversation and not a dismissive knee jerk reaction. Your comment reads like “I haven’t read a standard for this or bothered to really take a look and it’s new therefore it’s fundamentally bad and insecure and not worth my time”. This repo is simply proposing using signed timestamps for auth. It would be nice to keep the discussion on that topic and it’s merits. Personally I think webauthn is not too complex and just needs to not be locked up in browser land so we can have a real softkey impl so we probably actually agree on our general outlook. You’re just kind a being a security diva about the whole thing and it’s not really fair to the author.
Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @09:49AM (#30488926)
Which part was knee jerk? I read everything on the (minimal) webpage. It doesn’t explain anything of substance, nor does it anticipate the (obvious) issues other commenters here noted. It’s like the author just proposed to remove everything they didn’t understand from Webauthn and was left with this.

Honestly, this discussion isn’t worth the time.

As for software webauthn keys:

- What do you mean “locked up in browser land?” You can use FIDO elsewhere (e.g. ssh https://ubuntu.com/blog/enhanced-ssh-and-fido-authentication...).

- Softkeys are available—in fact, iOS, Android, MacOS, and Windows 11 all do webauthn by default, without the need for a hardware token.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by dcow on Sunday February 27, 2022 @12:37PM (#30490533)
And what’s left is essentially wireguard for logins. People love wireguard for its simplicity because it doesn’t use certs and PAKEs and whatnot. Yeah there are valid criticisms and I’ve critiqued the work as well in other comments. But the “this is utter shit how could anyone imagine this is a valid idea” is not productive.

> Honestly, this discussion isn’t worth the time.

That’s my point. If it’s not worth your time then let others who are interested discuss rather than just pissing all over the author’s project.

> - Softkeys are available—in fact, iOS, Android, MacOS, and Windows 11 all do webauthn by default, without the need for a hardware token.

That’s not soft keys it’s “platform authenticator”.

When I say softkeys I mean keys managed by a user agent such that they can be portable, like is common with ssh. SSH is popular because it’s gives users the freedom to easily elect their security posture: do they want a user key that can be deployed to different devices or are they super paranoid and want a device key. Do they want a software agent to manage soft keys for them and it can handle the device security and hardware crypto engine support. Not your concern, not the protocols concern, not the services concern: it’s the user’s concern.

Wireguard has soft keys, too.

WebAuthn’s crowd and browser implementers on the other hand seem fixated on making sure users never have the option to deploy the protocol in such a way. That’s the problem.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @01:34PM (#30491089)
> People love wireguard for its simplicity because it doesn’t use certs and PAKEs and whatnot.

I don't know of a VPN that uses PAKE, so I don't get this comparison, but whatever.

My point about certs was that OP was effectively proposing self-signed X509 client certs. It's unclear to me in what way those are harder to use than the proposal here, except that they actually are a widely accepted standard with user agent support.

> WebAuthn’s crowd and browser implementers on the other hand seem fixated on making sure users never have the option to deploy the protocol in such a way. That’s the problem.

https://github.com/herrjemand/awesome-webauthn#software-auth...?

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by dcow on Sunday February 27, 2022 @04:23PM (#30492649)
It kinda feels like you’re deliberately talking around my point. I’m not saying existing VPNs use PAKEs and it makes them bad. I’m saying you don't need a PAKE to have “modern” authentication. And look at wireguard which is loved for being a dead simple protocol that uses raw keypairs. Therefor it’s not absurd to imagine a very simple protocol like this.

You are correct that client certs have user agent support. Honestly it’s a pretty poor UX though. Have you actually tried building a consumer application that uses client certs in the browser? Good luck getting users to install client certs. Client certs work fine everywhere else where you can run bespoke client software (native apps) except for the part where they authenticate the connection and not the request, but that’s not the point either.

Anyway it’s great that other implementations of webauthn exist. But like I just said for client certs: outside of the browser anyone can do anything so webauthn is not a game changer there (not to downplay it). Where WebAuthn matters is for client authentication in the browser and in that arena it is locked down to platform auth and hardware device auth mechanisms. There is no way users could benefit from webauthn right now without the browser-supplied UX.

All I’m saying is that WebAuthn would be way more viable in the way people are asking for in this thread if for example browsers/platforms allowed extensions to participate as a soft WebAuthn agent so that users could choose their preferred WebAuthn backend and UX instead of the browser supplied options. The browser client cert UX sucks and so does browser vendor WebAuthn and I think their adoption story is all the proof you need.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by KingOfCoders on Sunday February 27, 2022 @09:02AM (#30488487)
What does prevent google.com liging into Microsoft con within one millisecond after receiving the signature?
Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by octoberfranklin on Saturday February 26, 2022 @11:13PM (#30485354)
> - The suggestion of signing the timestamp means that any web site you log into with this can log in as you to any other web site you log in to

This is a (privacy) feature, not a bug. It forces you to use a different public key for each website.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:24AM (#30486414)
FIDO keys are also unlinkable across origins (or identities!), but unlike in this scheme, that property doesn't rely on the user knowing to not reuse keys.

Anyway, unclear to me how this is better than x509 client certs, except that the author probably doesn't know about them.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by octoberfranklin on Sunday February 27, 2022 @04:02AM (#30486561)
Device attestation certificates, for starters. FIDO prevents user-controlled hardware. That's the whole point of FIDO, and why it's awful.

FIDO is the banking world's version of the Intel Management Engine and HDCP.

https://fidoalliance.org/specs/FDO/FIDO-Device-Onboard-RD-v1...

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @04:42AM (#30486761)
I'm not sure what you're replying to--this scheme is much closer to self-signed X509 client certs, not FIDO. But regarding FIDO, it does not prevent user-controlled hardware; it's up to RPs to choose if they require specific device manufacturers or not.

In my experience, the vast majority of (consumer) RPs do not require specific batch attestation, which is why you can make your own FIDO key: https://github.com/google/OpenSK.

I am under the impression support for attestation was controversial in FIDO--it's clearly useful for enterprise scenarios (e.g. where an enterprise requires some silly certification like FIPS: https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016614760-Ac...), but there's always the risk that consumer-facing RPs require it for no good reason.

My employer requires FIPS certification due to FedRAMP; I'd be interested in how you would propose to change FIDO such that--as now--I can use a single key for work and for all my consumer needs while eliminating attestation. (One obvious option is for my employer to issue already-enrolled keys and disallow self-enrollment, but that has other headaches...)

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by tialaramex on Sunday February 27, 2022 @07:33AM (#30487787)
The WebAuthn spec. explicitly tells RPs not to do this (attestation) unless they're sure they really need it.

Even Microsoft's half-arsed explanation of how this works inside Azure AD says you should probably not use it.

And I tell Firefox "No" when it asks me during enrollment if the site is allowed attestation from my devices, there are no public sites I've used where this was rejected as unacceptable, that includes GitHub, Google's sites, Facebook, and Login.gov.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by octoberfranklin on Sunday February 27, 2022 @04:45AM (#30486767)
> it's up to RPs to choose if they require specific device manufacturers or not.

The point is that it takes that choice out of the users' hands.

Choosing which manufacturer's hardware to use, or even to make their own, is the user's choice to make.

> use a single key for work and for all my consumer needs

You shouldn't. That's like expecting to be able to use your work laptop for personal stuff.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @05:10AM (#30486883)
> The point is that it takes that choice out of the users' hands.

Unclear to me why you think the user--and not the IdP--should have the final say here.

> You shouldn't. That's like expecting to be able to use your work laptop for personal stuff.

Except FIDO identities are unlinkable even if using the same hardware.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by dcow on Sunday February 27, 2022 @10:08AM (#30489086)
Because for consumer auth we just go back to the CA oligarchy and client certs nobody uses if we rely on trusting vendor attestation.

I understand for a corporate setup employees are threat vectors. But that depressing outlook isn't how most people view the consumer space. We want: consumer x signed this auth challenge. We do not want: authority Y said consumer X signed this auth challenge. That’s just CA SSO style oligarchy repeated.

Why wouldn't you trust the consumer and their preferred authentication agent to participate in an authentication challenge? Consumer apps don’t need to ensure that consumers are using a hardware token device they just need to arrange an authentication dance that doesn't involve a shared secret.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Sunday February 27, 2022 @11:44AM (#30490007)
It depends a lot on the situation. I think it’s reasonable, for example, for banks who have different liability standards depending on how transactions are authenticated to require batch attestation.

But like I said, most consumer IdPs aren’t doing attestation checks, and it’s discouraged, so I think you’re making a big deal of it. :)

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by octoberfranklin on Sunday February 27, 2022 @06:15PM (#30493851)
I had a Bank of America token-card (the one with the LCD display and button) until they discontinued it. Those things are fine. It was no larger or heavier than their ATM card, and in fact some banks combined the two into a single card. There was no need for any FIDO-like standardization or certification authorities there because the same entity (the bank) had provided both ends of the authentication conversation (the token card and the bank's website).

If a bank feels the need to control the hardware I use, they must provide that hardware. Their needs absolutely do not entitle them to impose codesigning/bootloader-locking requirements on my other devices, such as my phone or my laptop.

> aren’t doing attestation checks, and it’s discouraged

That will change. If it weren't, they wouldn't have bothered putting it into the spec. Or they could have used symmetric cryptography for attestation, like the bank-issued token cards and the chip in your chip-and-PIN card do.

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by md_ on Monday February 28, 2022 @01:44AM (#30497051)
The nice thing about FIDO is that I can use the same USB key for a bunch of different websites. I have a single key on my keyring, and I use it for Github, for my brokerage, for Gmail, for my work, etc.

And the reason I can do that is because my work cares that I use a FIPS compliant key, but nobody else does—because consumer RPs don’t do this.

Have you encountered any consumer RP enforcing attestation? Or is this concern of yours totally speculative?

I don’t know what this Bank of America card you refer to is, but presumably it was phishable auth, since it had an LCD key? Without a standard supported by user-agents, I don’t know how someone would enforce an out-of-band/unphishable auth mechanism like FIDO+Webauthn on their own, but I’m curious to hear you explain it!

Re:Login with a Public Ed25519 Key by Zamicol on Sunday February 27, 2022 @03:39PM (#30492272)
I want to be able to link my identity across website. I want to be able to have a key on my phone that's known as my phone key.