In modern drives, the specific write operation may be queued up on the physical disk in volatile storage outside the control of the operating system. A flush can’t help you with this problem, flush is for the operating system to flush its cache to disk.
This is where F_FULLFSYNC comes in. It is a request to the disk to finish flushing the volatile caches to nonvolatile storage. Some disks just ignore this request, claiming to be done before that is actually true.
In these cases no userland or even kernel level programming tricks can save you from data loss, since you can’t actually know when the data becomes safe on the disk.
This still seems like it makes the assumption that the move will complete. Or is 'mv' significantly different from the full write?
Also, the data you wrote to a file before the rename may not have been flushed completely to cold storage. Rename doesn't change here anything. The data may still be served from the disk controller's cache.
The rename trick is mostly useful for "committing" long operations, which even on the high level are not atomic. But it has nothing to do with flushing.
Also, renaming a file is a filesystem-level operation. From the POV of a disk, it looks the same as any other write. So if you can't make sure that normal writes are flushed, you can't make sure that renames are flushed.
Another note: rename(2) used not to be even atomic wrt power loss on ext4 (which was later fixed), so it's not guaranteed. POSIX itself only guarantees atomicity wrt other filesystem operations. Atomicity against power loss is a distinct checkbox. You need to check your specific filesystem.
Definite agreement on that. In many ways it's even less understood nowadays as pervasive reliable building power and UPSes are largely taken for granted, so the operational knowledge of the problem has been fading away until some cloud service loses an important circuit and suddenly a database has unpredictable data corruption.
The reality is that, unless you're heavily reliant on platform-specific behaviour and are certain you're not, for example, dealing with files over NFS, or hardware which happens to relax any guarantees you thought you had, nothing is really guaranteed.
The best defense I've seen against the uncertainty of whether files are written is to use the strategy required when writing to a Maildir-format mailbox. This employs a directory used for temporary writes to unique filenames, followed by a move into place in a 'real' directory, where files should be accessible once write is deemed to be complete.
Those who've been around for some time may have experienced corrupt mailboxes where the storage format was something mbox-alike - with all messages held in one file (and there's no fancy database-style transaction handling to deal with integrity).
Any kind of cross-platform development where files are written to is made more difficult and less performant, thanks to this problem. In many cases, I'm afraid this is poorly understood, or ignored. I don't think there's even a way to measure how often data corruption occurs due to this not being accounted for.