I appreciate Aaronsons critique, he himself makes my main point of disagreements, i.e. that when constructing a physical systems that has the properties he describes (modified Vandermonde Matrix) it might give nontrivial surprises.

But even accepting that IIT is wrong in the "consciousness might imply high IIT score, but not vice versa" sense, I'm simply not aware of any definition which is as *attackble* because of it's formal specification.

This is not me going "well you don't have anything better", but me asking to be pointed to similarly strictly defined notions of consciousness

I found the conversation between you two interesting (as well as Scott Aaronson's post), so I figured I could contribute with a potentially relevant piece of reading: "Hard Criteria for Empirical Theories of Consciousness" (24-page PDF) at https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?artic...

In the same ballpark as IIT, I've seen many mentions of GWT/GNT (global neuronal workspace theory). But the PDF covers that and many others. I don't have any particular "conclusion" myself, but it's just a fascinating discussion to be swimming in even when utterly clueless.

EDIT: And I forgot the most obvious link that I actually had read in the past, Stanford's page on conciousness talks about theories: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#SpeTheCon

I am not aware of anything similarly strictly defined, but that is not, of course, evidence for the correctness or even usefulness of IIT, and nor does it somehow counter the specific objections that Aaronson raises.