The majority of exploits take advantage of basic mistakes in configuration or code. Most of those issues are well understood, which is why you've seen this rise of detection tools and automation. Big hacks nowadays are necessarily a daisy-chain of exploits, because we're better at security at certain layers.
But overall, we're far from perfection. Solid configuration and code takes thought and planning - two luxuries rarely afforded to product teams when the business is screaming for release.
Past that point, it’s daisy chains of exploits as you say. It’s not uncommon for sophisticated attackers to sit on a number of 0-day exploits until they find a venue to deliver them. This is one of the reasons the Log4j announcement was scary—it opened up a venue to a wide variety of applications and infrastructure that were previously protected through other means.
> But overall, we're far from perfection. Solid configuration and code takes thought and planning - two luxuries rarely afforded to product teams when the business is screaming for release.
I’ve found a big part of a good security program is helping an organization calibrate it’s actual risk appetite. If business ending events are known and understood, everyone should know in what cases a security issue becomes a blocker.
In many companies, it is just a box to be checked (by a separate Compliance department who does not have access to the codebase only emails to designated contacts in Engineering), and thinking about it beyond that will merely impede one's ability to achieve designated objectives. For anyone actually "making stuff" in this kind of environment, security is (at best) documenting having followed procedure to deflect blame if something bad happens.
It is not: https://blog.cryptohack.org/twitter-secrets
Regardless of technical details, this is a dummy key for a CTF server - it's not used for anything meaningful.
What was the admin password for this huge hosting company?
"internet"
Another anecdote. Worked for a startup 20 years ago. We had millions of users. For some reason we left all the passwords in plaintext in the DB. One day we decide to query the DB for a sorted list of the most common passwords. They were: password trustno1 12345 123456 12345678
That 2nd one had to have been due to the X-Files still being shown at that point.
To be fair, I bet there are a lot of things like that out there, along with folk using “password1” as their login.
…but it felt like a bit of let down in the story.
1) Get shell access!
2) look for a commit entitled “root key here”
3) profit!
I was a bit disappointed, I was hoping for some exploit… but I guess often this stuff is just mundane human failures.
…also, is it fine to only partially redact a private key in an image?
I mean, tell me I’m wrong here, but isn’t that kinda bad? (Maybe it’s just a mock image for the post, who knows).