So it's not as if there's an widely accepted principal of "patch as quickly as possible". There are tens, probably even hundreds, of terribly severe remote code execution bugs known to major vendors and not yet patched. Patching takes time and money. It's not instantaneous.
It is somewhat widely accepted that if people are actively exploiting a vulnerability, it should be disclosed. But if there were known exploits for this vulnerability, chances are Adobe wouldn't be sitting on the fix.
The moment one of the vulnerabilities is found “in the wild," the patch is automatically pushed into the wild, Adobe be damned.
First, how would a system that searches for exploits in the wild then releases patches for those vulnerabilities have a primary purpose of “putting pressure on Adobe?” Its primary purpose is to protect the users of its products from an exploit.
Second, help me understand why I should care about how hard Adobe’s team works. Are you saying they deserve our sympathy? Or implying that since they are smart and working hard, we cannot expect any better results than they are getting?
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/08/fuzzing-at-...
One of the exciting things about working on security at Google is that you have a lot of compute horsepower available if you need it. This is very useful if you’re looking to fuzz something, and especially if you’re going to use modern fuzzing techniques. ... We recently decided to apply the same techniques to fuzz Adobe’s Flash Player, which we include with Chrome in partnership with Adobe.
we cranked through 20 terabytes of SWF file downloads followed by 1 week of run time on 2,000 CPU cores to calculate the minimal set of about 20,000 files. Finally, those same 2,000 cores plus 3 more weeks of runtime were put to good work mutating the files in the minimal set (bitflipping, etc.) and generating crash cases. These crash cases included an interesting range of vulnerability categories, including buffer overflows, integer overflows, use-after-frees and object type confusions.
I would not be surprised if over half of this year's weeks fall under the case of having a vulnerability they have issued an advisory for and have yet to patch.
If you find out a vulnerability is being exploited in the wild, and already have a patch or technical description, you should release it. If one of the two parts commits a mistake and releases information about the vulnerability (like, for example, a patch that can be reverse-engineered), then all other involved parts should release what they have.
If they don't have a patch or if they aren't ready to release it, which seems to be the case here, Adobe should at least release technical details. These can be used to mitigate the impact of the vulnerability on unpatched hosts.
What if they have detected black hats exploiting the vulnerability. Should they sit on a fix?
What if they were building their own implementation of a programming language or tool. For example, what if they found a bug in JS that could be used to exploit browsers. Arethey allowed to fix the implementation in V8 or must they sit on it until everyone else patches JS in their browsers?
(These are sincere questions, not rhetoric. I am not a security professional, and I am fully aware that some things are more complicated in practice than they may appear from the comfort of an arm chair.)