Whether the bombs were the sole-cause of the surrender is a rather different discussion, and one I understand few historians would argue. It seems difficult to argue that they had no effect given that we now have records of what Japanese leadership was discussing at the time and atomics feature prominently, alongside the soviet invasion. That's why the whole consensus school thing exists, because neither was obviously definitive.
Sure. But to be fair-- there were tons of civilian experts involved that had no great personal stake; It's not like it was written by arms manufacturer lobbyists or generals personally involved in past decision making.
And I'm mostly missing strong fact-based counterarguments, so my personal opinion is going to remain that the atomic bombings probably expedited Japans surrender, but were not necessary (nor would a ground invasion have been).
"The experience of the Pacific war supports the findings of the Survey in Europe that heavy, sustained and accurate attack against carefully selected targets is required to produce decisive results when attacking an enemy's sustaining resources . It further supports the findings in Germany that no nation can long survive the free exploitation of air weapons over its homeland . For the future it is important fully to grasp the fact that enemy planes enjoying control of the sky over one's head can be as disastrous to one's country as its occupation by physical invasion."
It does literally end with a call to separate the Army Air Forces from the Army.
I haven't found a copy of the whole report, including the hundreds of individual reports, but I've been given to understand that they are thorough, detailed, and contradictory.
First: This was written after the war was over-- "justifying further fire-bombing" would be pretty ineffective at that point.
Also, to quote from the survey: > We underestimated the ability of our air attack on Japan's home islands, coupled as it was with blockade and previous military defeats, to achieve unconditional surrender without invasion. By July 1945, the weight of our air attack had as yet reached only a fraction of its planned proportion, Japan's industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost its confidence in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to accept surrender. The only remaining problem was the timing and terms of that surrender.
This does NOT read like a justification for *more* fire-bombing to me, but rather like a "we bombed them much more than necessary before July already".
IIRC, they were:
1. The form of the government is to be preserved; i.e. the Emperor's position is maintained. (I cannot remember if the rest of the government was included, but I don't think so.)
2. Japan is responsible for demobilizing its military.
3. There will be no occupation.
4. Japan is responsible for handling its own war crimes.
Probably more of a modern rationalization/justification for the bombings and quite questionable. Consider:
The US strategic bombing survey (an "impartial assessment of the effects of strategic bombing") concluded:
> "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."