In other words, even if you have an easily-exploited attack vector available to you, you still need to know a lot about your target in order to cause damage. Contrast this to guided missiles, which don't really need to know anything about the building that they are blowing up other than its GPS coordinates.
For this reason, I'm skeptical that "any dumb hacker" will ever be capable of causing something like a nuclear meltdown via virus infection.
On the other hand, triggering the reactor to automatically shut down would be pretty easy -- and if you shut down all the nuclear reactors in the US for a few weeks, you'll certainly have made a significant impact.
Knock out several of those in critical locations, and you start to grind the U.S. economy to a halt.
You don't need to go nuclear. And destroying the engine was a fairly simple task of pushing it well outside its performance envelope.
EDIT: Looks like pnathan already cited this event -- see the last link in this comment:
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3035909
It's a bit older than I remembered. The article is dated September, 2007.
I note incidentally that for one "catastrophic" scenario they describe, with an estimated "cost" of $700 billion, the damages figure now pales in comparison to what the U.S. economy has been through in the last few years. A bit of a lesson of its own regarding the rhetoric that surrounds the actual topic.
Of course there are safeguards to prevent catastrophes, but even stopping some part of the automation in an industrial plant could easily cause serious problems such as damaged equipment and downtime for debugging.
Computer-controlled systems that can have disastrous real-world consequences almost always have built-in checks to avoid these failure states.
Imagine you have a plastics plant running with ACME SCADA system. Your plastics plant has molten plastic running through the facility 24/7. It's actually a lights-out facility, and you're making 1M per day. You schedule six days a year for maintenance, three days every six months, to do a look-see at the pipes. This takes about one day to spin the plant down, one day to audit the pipes, and one day to spin the plant up. This whole process costs you 3M in lost profit, plus the cost of auditing and the process cost of spinning up/down.
Now, your IT guy comes to you and says, "we gotta patch! ACME SCADA's got a hack out against it". Now remember, your ACME system is running the plant. If you power it down without the proper procedure, the pipes freeze with plastic, and your facility needs to be replaced.
What's the risk of you being hacked? You're a plastics facility, making Widgets for economists and their lectures. No one really cares about Widgets. Anyway, you're in the badlands of Boondockia, USA.
Your expected cost of patches must be below the expected cost of being hacked for you to apply the patches.
---
That's the sort of requirements which SCADA owners have to deal with. It's not simply a question of laziness.
The electric power grid security is an area of national concern in the US. I read a report to Congress (publically available) a few years back that suggested the power grid was being hacked in quite a few ways. Googling electric power grid security returns a plethora of results, all of them reporting problems.
Here's a few reports. I haven't evaluated them for reliability and accuracy.
A 2009 report that kicked off a lot of talk http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html
This one is old http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/1998/06/12746
This one is 'new', as of Jan '11. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11117.pdf
Here's a blog on it: http://smartgridsecurity.blogspot.com/
Lockheed sez they are going to work on it. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/lockheed-promises-e...
In 2010, we got some national guidelines. http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/nist-finalizes-i...
A video of some congressional testimony: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIPQRKAmCWo
China is frequently cited in this business http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_...
And MacAfee has a report on China going after energy companies. http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-en...
Explode a generator! (this can be mitigated) http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-26/us/power.at.risk_1_genera...
Is this really the case? I'm nothing close to a security specialist, so maybe I'm talking out of my ass. Still, everything I read on the subject said that Stuxnet was especially impressive in that it exploited not one but several previously-unknown OS-level exploits, on top of the embedded systems attacks it used. With these zero-days now discovered and hopefully patched, how much more value does Stuxnet offer?
(Neither of these questions are rhetorical — hopeful that one of our resident experts can fill me in.)