Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by hinkley on Sunday February 13, 2022 @08:46PM
(#30327563)
The classical problem in software and apparently in engineering is that some suit with a big mouth makes promises that can't be kept, and then makes everything difficult for everyone else by trying to make their lie true. Either people sacrifice their health, sanity and families bending over backward trying to cover for them, or some safety problem makes it into the product due to false constraints.
The 737 Max was sold on not having to do certain kinds of retraining. "Something wrong with the training" is a divide by zero error here. There was no training. If memory serves this was also tied up in how much and what kind of recertification the FAA would require for a 'new' plane versus a refit of an existing one. Training means newness, and newness means retesting. The lies snowballed into dead passengers.
The 737 Max was sold on not having to do certain kinds of retraining. "Something wrong with the training" is a divide by zero error here. There was no training. If memory serves this was also tied up in how much and what kind of recertification the FAA would require for a 'new' plane versus a refit of an existing one. Training means newness, and newness means retesting. The lies snowballed into dead passengers.