Lets say you have a legitimate website with uses form POST's or GET's to implement cross-site requests to some service on a different domain, authenticated through a cookie. This is vulnerable to cross-site request forging. Changing this to use fetch with CORS can protect against this kind of attack, since the service can now ensure the request is initiated from a legitimate origin.
It is just important to understand what CORS protect against and what it doesn't protect against. You can always forge a request to look exactly like a CORS-compliant request from a legitimate origin - but you still wouldn't have the necessary authentication cookie. If the attacker have somehow gotten access to the users cookie, then there is no need for request-forging in the first place, the attacker can just directly log into the service. If the users browser is compromised it is the same. So CORS protect against the specific scenario where a malicious site visited by a legitimate user forges a request to a legitimate site, misusing the authentication cookie associated with the legitimate domain. In this scenario, the CORS header will indicate the origin of the malicious site, and the server will be able to reject the request.
Otherwise a malicious site could just forge the Origin header in the preflight request.
yep, that's what Cross-Origin Resource Policy (CORP) for. It is designed to seal the last loop hole in same-origin policy. (img and scripts don't require cors at all) But there is a big gotcha, the old browser that don't know about it simply don't care. So it isn't strictly useful for now.
My favorite is... imagine I routinely port-forward an app's debug port to my workstation for debugging. It has a useful /[email protected] endpoint. You can then call that over the Internet by serving me a web page that contains <img src="http://localhost:1234/email-debug-info?address=example@examp...">. CORS doesn't care. My browser doesn't care. It will just silently leak information. (Also great for other things on your network. Log into your router at 192.168.1.1 recently? Someone can make a web page with a form that submits to http://192.168.1.1/enable-port-forwarding or whatever, and you can forward whatever ports you want.)
What's hilarious to me is that CORS seems burdensome in the opposite direction too. It breaks peoples applications somehow! While writing this comment, I did a search to see if I could remember the standards-track proposal for fixing the two "bugs" I mention above... but all the search results are people asking how to disable CORS rules because their app is broken. Sigh! The web is a mess.
It soon will https://web.dev/cors-rfc1918-feedback/
I don't really understand the first one or why you think SOP should protect you in that case. Could you restate that problem?
The second one is a CSRF issue, as noted by another user.
The third thing you describe is not people who disable CORS but actually use CORS to the max (usally things like Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *), because they don't understand what it does. It's a huge problem...
This is just a CSRF issue, which is well understood and easily fixed with a CSRF/authenticity token.
Also, GET requests should not have side effects like sending an email. A reasonable default seen in some frameworks is GET requests have no side effects and don't require CSRF tokens, while all other verbs do.
Really CORS cannot be used to lock anything down. The behavior of a server not implementing CORS has the same end result as a server trying to be as restrictive as possible. Both would not send any CORS headers in responses and would simply ignore pre-flight requests.