Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by asd4232 on Monday February 07, 2022 @03:32AM
(#30241891)
A typical pilot switches aircraft type multiple times in their career. It's all about the cost and convenience ultimately, allowing same pilots to fly both 737MAX and the older 737NG as most 737MAX customers operate both.
As far as MCAS goes, in my opinion Airbus got it right already in the 80's in their A320 with their flight envelope protection.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by wikfwikf on Monday February 07, 2022 @04:55AM
(#30242544)
Do you understand how delusional it sounds in this specific context to say that not needing retraining improves safety? Not that it might improve safety or should improve safety, but that it does improve safety?
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by dpark on Monday February 07, 2022 @09:24AM
(#30245237)
"Not needing retraining" is another way of saying "works as expected".
Yes, it would likely have been safer if the 737 Max worked as expected by the pilots flying it.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by rramadass on Monday February 07, 2022 @08:57AM
(#30244885)
Rightly said!
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by mannykannot on Monday February 07, 2022 @08:09AM
(#30244311)
> Not needing retraining was a good goal because it improves safety.
That only works if retraining is not actually needed. Boeing's own test program gave adequate (but undisclosed, at the time) information for an independent observer to conclude that this was not the case here.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software devel...
by VBprogrammer on Monday February 07, 2022 @08:42AM
(#30244685)
I'm not sure I could agree that MCAS is a sound concept. Moving the trim automatically to account for the pitch up at high angles of attack feels like a hack, like restarting a dodgy service every couple of hours rather than fixing the underlying issues.
I've never understood why the fix wasn't implemented in the elevator feel computer. Except perhaps that it doesn't have AoA inputs and it's an old hydroelectrical system for which there may be a lack detailed knowledge.
It's not just a cost saving measure.
MCAS was a sound concept. It's implementation, however, was not sound at all.