This is a deceptive way of putting it. Yes, if you fiddle with the window you are looking at, it is possible for the short sellers's volume to make a majority of volume (e.g. for a given 5 minute window). But a reasonable person would look at the graph in the report and come to a completely different conclusion [1].
If you look at that cumulative volume of short seller volume, it is not possible to close out the reported 122.97% short interest. Let alone the "unofficial" short interest of >200% that came out of the RobinHood hearings.
The controversy surrounding the stock stems from this disconnect of short volume and retail volume, and an article that ignores this (especially when talking about the figure who rose to fame off the back figuring this out), speaks to how little research was actually done. Especially when they spin it as a clear cut "short squeeze" when it appears to be anything but.
That's talking about the longer lasting effects (i.e. the reason GME stayed at $100+)
but from p26:
> particularly during the earlier rise from January 22 to 27 the price of GME rose as the short interest decreased. Staff also observed discrete periods of sharp price increases during which accounts held by firms known to the staff to be covering short interest in GME were actively buying large volumes of GME shares, in some cases accounting for very significant portions of the net buying pressure during a period
The run up to $500 was almost certainly a short squeeze