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Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by jmillikin on Sunday September 18, 2011 @03:02PM (#3010977)
WEP is completely broken. Even if you do everything right, it's trivial for an attacker to access a WEP-protected network.

  most of the time when a browser warns you that a certificate is bad there's nothing wrong
I've never had a false-positive browser warning. I assume you're complaining about Firefox's and Chrome's treatment of self-signed certificates, which is completely appropriate. Self-signed certificates should always be rejected, unless the user has manually added them to the keystore.
Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by ori_b on Sunday September 18, 2011 @03:17PM (#3011005)
The problem is that to the average user, a self-signed certificate that they should accept appears EXACTLY THE SAME as a bad SSL certificate.
Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by jmillikin on Sunday September 18, 2011 @04:21PM (#3011157)
Users should not accept self-signed certificates. IMO, browsers shouldn't even offer them the option. If someone is smart enough to verify the certificate fingerprint, they can add it to their certificate store manually.
Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by archivator on Sunday September 18, 2011 @05:18PM (#3011285)
I disagree. SSL is meant to do 2 things: prove identity and provide encryption. Self-signed certificates do just the latter. While, yes, they might provide a false sense of security in that they can't prevent MITM attacks, at least you're not sending out data in the open.
Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by marshray on Sunday September 18, 2011 @05:32PM (#3011322)
Ever since the first released version SSLv2, http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02... it has had the stated goal of defending against MitM attack.

Still, if protection from completely passive eavesdropping is all you care about, you can use anonymous Diffie-Hellman to negotiate an ephemeral key. The protocol supports it. Heck a lot of home-grown client software doesn't even check the name on the cert and ends up with effectively just that by accident.

Feel free to add your own self-signed exceptions. I find it useful myself.

But that's not what HTTPS is and it's not how web browsers work. By definition, the lock icon in the user's browser means that the server (as displayed in the URL) has been authenticated to the user.

Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by rmc on Sunday September 18, 2011 @04:02PM (#3011109)
There are very few self-signed certs that the average user should accept. It's an acceptable tradeoff.
Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by Daniel14 on Sunday September 18, 2011 @03:37PM (#3011059)
> WEP is completely broken. Even if you do everything right, it's trivial fot an attacker yo access a WEP-protected network.

Can you elaborate on this? I'm genuinly curious.

Re:South Korea NIS admits to "packet tapping" Gmail by robtoo on Sunday September 18, 2011 @03:41PM (#3011067)