That is not the alternative because the mathematics of encryption is already very widely known. In the scenario where all encryption is outlawed, there will be a black market for encryption tools designed for criminals (this already exists today) and society will not be significantly safer. Or alternatively, open source encryption software development will continue happen outside the UK/USA/AU.
Banning encryption will only make inept criminals (those who don't have the resources or aren't smart enough to buy the encryption tools) easier to catch and the general public unsafe. If the police are having trouble catching inept criminals to the point that they want to make the general public unsafe, the issue here isn't the encryption.
I can't get my head round how they think this could be implemented without insane amounts of money and a rule book like war and peace.
I mean, even if you hypothetically made it impossible for computers to carry out encryption (bake into CPUs some heuristic for what encryption looks like and block it or something), folks could be taught to use ElsieFour[1] which is probably secure enough to make things about as hard as they are today. I'm sure if this hypothetical ban actually happened folks would find ways of making it easy to do ChaCha20 by hand.
And as evidence that history repeats, you can always tattoo a Perl program that implements AES on your arm like some hackers in the US did in the 90s.
The Register is only showing an example of #3, but leaves #1 and #2 unaddressed:
1. Your Identity (who everyone is)
2. Your Conversations (with whom, when)
3. Your Content (what was said)
Does the UK government have the ability to identify #1 and #2 for E2EE connections, and they desire #3 (content)?
Is the UK government only able to identify #2, and they desire #1 (identities) and #3 (content)? If so, which is more important to them: Identity, or Content?
I suspect they are much more desperate for Identity and Connections, than they necessarily are for Content, and that their attempt to overreach and backdoor all encryption could be shutdown by offering them #1 and #2 but not #3.
This is obviously unpalatable to consider to "perfect anonymity is the only way" adherents, but it's probably time to consider discussing it, when the alternative is a government backdooring or banning all encryption. It's too bad The Register didn't take that chance, but we could at any time.