random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it
random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
random: mix rdrand with entropy sent in from userspace
random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness()
random: add backtracking protection to the CRNG
random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG
random: use an improved fast_mix() function
random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded
random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites
random: allow fractional bits to be tracked
And often very little justification or reasoning is recorded: random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG
The CRNG is faster, and we don't pretend to track entropy usage in the
CRNG any more.
> I would be careful with the assumption that something like Fortuna is a "published and reviewed specification"; Fortuna is really just a case study Ferguson and Schneier wrote in _Practical Cryptography_. It's not a standard, or the winner of some kind of RNG design competition.Well that's basically what a standard is, in my mind. I place little weight on additional initials of organizations which publish standards, I just think they should be there so the design can be analyzed and examined as a whole, and by people who are not experts in C programming or want to wade through the Linux source.
The section of the paper you linked would be a fine standard for Linux's RNG except that it's a continually moving target.
And a complete design specification can certainly address the practical details of integration into a kernel, the random number subsystem in Linux has just a small interface with the rest of the kernel that can easily be captured abstractly.
1. It's not an unalloyed good thing to use "Fortuna", which is not so much a peer-reviewed standard as "a thing in a book with Bruce Schneier's name on it". I might be a little more nervous about a design that advertises being based on "Fortuna" than a random design, because the hard parts of doing a kernel CSPRNG are I think mostly not what they wrote about in that book.
2. Whether or not you have a reference design to base off of, you're still going to end up with a stream of fiddly commits determining i.e. when the generator is seeded well enough to release random bits to callers, or the order in which raw events are fed into the generator. Those annoying fiddly bits are the challenge of maintaining a secure RNG, and there's no standard anywhere that will release you from having to pay attention to that stuff (thankfully, Jason Donenfeld is doing that thankless work for us now).
The rest of it, sure. The LRNG sucks, and is ill-specified (if relatively well studied), and has a janky history. It's in good hands now! It should not be rewritten to comply with some "standard"! But sure, the rest of your arguments, well taken, &c &c.
There are standard RNG designs that NIST publishes, but they're low level, on the order of constructions, not whole system designs. A lot of the important details are OS-specific. It shouldn't make you more comfortable to hear that a system uses something like HMAC_DRBG; that detail doesn't tell you a whole lot about how the system as a whole works.
† See, for instance: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf --- skip to Section 5 for a pretty detailed description of the LRNG.