I'm was literally trained in the British variant of technique I'm describing. There's a wikipedia article about it, and it's referenced from this cryptography wiki's one-time-pad page. Other countries used similar systems.
I'll give it that's it's definitely way better than DRYAD, which is pretty universally not considered a OTP because of the much greater key reuse (like how auth uses the same cipher tables as encrypt, leaking tables). So it boils down to the practical use case on whether it falls into OTP.
A new row per message means you don't re-use between messages (message is something like a sentence).
Each message should be short enough that you don't re-use (a 22-symbol message is already crazy), and you are not allowed to re-use if that means re-using a target symbol, but yes you might slightly re-use within messages if you're being sloppy.
In reality you don't get through the pad very quickly due to the 'compression' of a dictionary for typical parts of messages.
(This is all public info, not disclosing anything here.)
They might have taught that use case to radio operator MOSs, but it wasn't actually deployed in the general case it seems.