It is not disingenuous to call data stored in plain text as stored in plain text. Transport security is very different from security at rest.
> Here is the FBI's own datasheet on what message content they're able to obtain with court order from Telegram [2]
Keep in mind that there are other governments with jurisdiction over Telegram that may have access. Additionally, data could be “leaked” by someone. Or, rules or owners of the data could change. Just because they don’t respond to a warrant doesn’t mean that data is safe when stored in plain text.
Data is not stored in plaintext. It is stored encrypted, at rest. Period. In the very Twitter thread posted at the top of the comments, Moxie states he uses "plaintext" as shorthand. So he is making up a new definition of plaintext to slander a competitor, something he loves to do and has done, repeatedly, throughout history. The Durovs, on the other hand, do not pull this kind of crap and are content to let their product speak for itself.
That’s the simple difference. Telegram is less encrypted than Facebook messenger is.
People understand that when we say passwords were stored in plaintext on a company's breached servers it's a lot more severe than when we say passwords were stored encrypted on a company's breached servers. If the encryption key was also leaked, we're in as much trouble as scenario A.
It is an abuse of our understanding of these words, which stand related but differentiated to each other, to use the word "plaintext" from scenario A interchangeably for "encrypted" in scenario B.
That is, at best, manipulative of people like you and I and of a media which is all too willing to stoke the fires of outrage.
Which part are you referring to?
I made a couple claims.
A. Telegram has access to all plain text content B. Someone with access to Telegrams infrastructure has access to plain text content C. Telegram is less encrypted than Facebook messenger
The first, I stand by. The second does make a few assumptions.
The second assumption, that if you have access to the infrastructure you could get access to the private key, this may not be true. Depending on how well they manage their systems. Something that any user will have to trust vs a trust less e2ee system.
The final one is, admittedly, incorrect. I misspoke. It’s _as encrypted_ as Facebook Messenger, and _less encrypted_ than WhatsApp.
I’d also consider the possibility that the document is planted and not fully accurate.
It's this kind of extreme paranoia that taints the entire world of populist secure messaging products, which actively drives me straight in the other direction.
I'm not a state target. But I do use Telegram's Secret Chats for things like discussing how great a trip into the woods on psychedelics can be. That's a great compromise, for me, and most others who use the platform. If you're a state target or you entertain such ideas as state actors trying to get your cat photos, please use another platform.
But there's zero need for this kind of mud-slinging that goes on, all the time, within the world of secure messaging products and platforms. The guy behind GrapheneOS does it, Moxie does it, the entire Signal fanbase does it, even going so far as to apologize for when a piece of their beloved product goes closed source for a year so Moxie can insert some terrible crypto coin he's a major investor of.