I mean, if you were at all serious about security you'd just not use it. So it's just as insecure.

This is a bizarre take. What's considered "serious security" depends on the needs of the person and the kind of info they're transmitting.

To tell people that there is no advantage to use Signal instead of much less secure alternatives because your Area 51 security requirements aren't met is actively harmful and bad advice.

LOL, "Area 51."

Whether Signal or Telegram, you rely completely on trust in the central third party for security.

The choice of whether to use Signal or Telegram should depend on which of these organizations you trust the most (their leadership, their internal employees, and their security from external infiltration), NOT based on what technology they use in the client & server.

But you simply shouldn't use either because real security is all about not having to trust anyone like that.

> you don't need to rely completely on trust in third parties because both produce reproducible open source clients (at least on android, not sure about apple) and if someone hands you at least a client that you can verify doesn't send out non-encrypted data you have some legitimate safety compared to a service that doesn't do that at all.

This is technically correct but not in a way that matters. Signal pushes everyone to depend on Google to distribute the software. Through this system, it isn't even just Signal, but also Google and anyone who breaks into Google that can inject a compromised client.

You don't know that the client on the other side isn't getting its Signal app through Google.

More importantly -- even if you DO know the client on the other side -- the WHOLE POINT of Signal is this massive network effect where you don't need to coordinate with the other side.

If we're talking about the much smaller network-within-a-network of users who installed Signal from a non-Google source -- it's no longer compelling. Why bother with it? Less error-prone to get both sides to set something else up.

you don't need to rely completely on trust in third parties because both produce reproducible open source clients (at least on android, not sure about apple) and if someone hands you at least a client that you can verify doesn't send out non-encrypted data you have some legitimate safety compared to a service that doesn't do that at all.

And that's why technology matters, because security is not binary. Very concrete example, someone uses Facebook Messenger, the police get the hands on their phone, arrest them for some chat content. Signal cannot do that, and you can verify they cannot. That's a real use case that people in particular in countries with oppressive governments run into at this very moment.

> I mean, if you were at all serious about security you'd just not use it. So it's just as insecure.

That doesn't make any sense at all. Being "serious about security" doesn't mean letting the perfect be the enemy of the good (which is what you're doing).

It's not good though. It has these flaws I just described. You can avoid those flaws simply by using other software.

Such as?

What other software has verifiable client builds and a server that stores as little information as Signal?