Re:Scuttlebutt Protocol Guide
by mlyle on Friday December 24, 2021 @01:05PM
(#29675983)
> Throw away anything at the first byte that breaks canonical representation, don't bother verifying its signature.
IMO, the opposite order is better because it means you verify that the message is sent by someone you minimally trust before exposing parsers, etc, to attack, and someone attempting attacks must sign the messages. Here, getting an identity is so easy that it doesn't make much of a difference.
As far as attack surface, the cryptographic implementation is hopefully smaller than a higher level parser. The performance implications are unclear (both parsing and signature verification can be expensive).
IMO, the opposite order is better because it means you verify that the message is sent by someone you minimally trust before exposing parsers, etc, to attack, and someone attempting attacks must sign the messages. Here, getting an identity is so easy that it doesn't make much of a difference.
As far as attack surface, the cryptographic implementation is hopefully smaller than a higher level parser. The performance implications are unclear (both parsing and signature verification can be expensive).