No, that is a common misunderstanding, especially understandable here since some of OP's formulations also conflate the two. If you're an econ person a good text that puts the prioritarian view in context is Matthew Adler's 2020 Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction. I'd also recommend that book to anyone here who claimed e.g. "we can't compare across persons!" but who is open to reading a case against that claim.
"The point being made here is that we do not assign any moral value to decreasing the well-being of those who are better off ..., but we do assign more moral value to increasing the utility of those who start from a lower base."
That's explicitly 0 weight on those who are "better off", leaving all the weight for those with the lowest utility. That's precisely the Rawlsian function. Traditionally Rawls only described the most extreme version, but softer versions with weights that are not all zero or one, but follow the same pattern are in the same family and also generally called "Rawlsian".
The former is a way, albeit too compressed by OP, to distinguish prioritarianism from the kind of egalitarian view where interpersonal relative differences affects the value of increasing/decreasing one individual's well-being, which makes egalitarianism the target of the so called levelling down critique. See Parfit's article that OP discusses for more on that distinction and critique.
Prioritarianism does not give 0 weight or value on increasing the well-being of those who are already better off - on the contrary a distinctive feature of prioritarianism is that increasing someone's well-being always has some value. It is only how much value that varies with the absolute level the increase starts from. In jargon the most prominent version of the prioritarian social welfare function is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave. In contrast a leximin SWF (sometimes called "rawlsian" because of some points of similarity with the features of one component, the difference principle, in Rawls systematic theory of justice) gives absolute lexical priority to increasing the worst-off positions well-being.
All this said, perhaps there is a way to relax or modify leximin SWF so as to make it functionally equivalent to a prioritarian SWF, but I'm not familiar with anyone doing so (happy to learn if you have a reference though!) and, regardless, to call that rawlsian would be unfair to Rawls since he definitely did not propose or argue for such a view in any of his texts on political philosophy and the view he did argue for is definitely incompatible with it.
This article presents a "priority view" as a contrasting moral view to "pure utilitarianism" and wonders why the view hasn't caught on outside of moral philosophy. The answer is that it has, and outside of philosophy we have models of aggregate utility that subsume both of the moral views in the article. This was a very active field from the 1930s-1970s, and now most of the interesting work here IMO is done in the cryptocurrency space (trying to find ways to prevent forks or incentivize participants to be pro-social).
The two points of view described in this article are just two specific "social welfare functions" we could optimize for. There are many others.
The "priority view" in this article is known as the "Kalai egalitarian bargaining solution" in economics and game theory, or the "Rawlsian" social welfare function (maximize the minimum individual utility):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperative_bargaining
The "pure utilitarianism" view is not a bargaining solution, but it's known as the "Benthamite" social welfare function (maximize the sum of individual utilities).