Too many acronyms. :-)
JNDI was the "Java Naming and Directory Interface", part of the suite of CORBA-like Java-only distributed object tooling.
My guess is that the "lookups" feature in log4j assumed that all URL protocols were "http:" or "https:" and didn't account for either the full set of built-in protocol handlers or the fact that an application can register additional protocol handlers.
It sounds like a classic X-to-Y-to-Z problem. Someone connected X to Y thinking Y was pretty safe even with untrusted input, not knowing it would ever proxy to Z (probably, everything you can do with JNDI on a local machine is safe). Someone else connected Y to Z thinking that Y is only passed trusted values so the new proxy feature could only be triggered deliberately. And here we are. This class of bug should have a name but probably doesn't.
And another person didn't document well that log messages must be trusted input...