Start nc (nc -lp 1234) and run this
org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager.getLogger("whatever").error("not safe {}", "${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1234/abc}")I'm not sure how this interacts with the RCE issue reported here.
EDIT: That's because I was thinking of Slf4j, which has additional smarts here.
> logger.info("Data: {}");
would effectively turn into something safe:
> logger.info("{}", "Data: {}");
And the issue would only arise if someone mixes the two patterns:
> logger.info("Data for " + username + ": {}", data);
Overall, I don't like the sound of that feature, since it blurs the line between correct and incorrect use of the logging API. The first argument should always be a constant formatting string.
I guess aesthetically you could argue either way, but I think the main purpose of the formatting string method is that you can write:
> logger.trace("Updates: {}", longListOfUpdates);
and if trace logging is disabled (which can be done dynamically), it's not going to invoke `longListOfUpdates.toString()`, which is what happens when you perform string concatenation. If it didn't work that way, I suspect people would end up writing extra `logger.isTraceEnabled()` conditions around their logging code.
EDIT: nevermind, the issue apparently arises outside of formatting strings—though it would have been nice if the example had demonstrated this.
The issue occurs in incorrect logging code such as:
> logger.info("Data: " + data);
But the correct way of logging the above data is:
> logger.info("Data: {}", data);
It's analogous to using something like the following in C:
> printf(data);
In the incorrect cases (log4j or C), the user input is being used as a format string, and the user can likely cause an RCE. This is an issue in C for reasons that should be obvious. Java has historically been used very reflectively, so whenever there's some expression interpreter or deserialiser involved, there's a good chance it could be RCEd with arbitrary input.