Re:U.K. regulators order Meta to sell Giphy
by tehjoker on Tuesday November 30, 2021 @10:28PM
(#29400336)
You are right, but these are the very ideas I've been complaining are part of the US's constitutional DNA in this thread, so we'll have to disagree.
Re:U.K. regulators order Meta to sell Giphy
by JumpCrisscross on Tuesday November 30, 2021 @10:57PM
(#29400496)
> these are the very ideas I've been complaining are part of the US's constitutional DNA in this thread, so we'll have to disagree
I think we agree. There is meat between the archetypal framework and the working, practical government. The framework is neutral. But the implementation details are not.
My core point is that more democracy = good is a misreading of American, and in fact world, history. We have a mixed system. Denouncing one system over another for being less democratic is thus a straw man.
Re:U.K. regulators order Meta to sell Giphy
by TazeTSchnitzel on Tuesday November 30, 2021 @05:59PM
(#29398524)
> One can have a liberal, conservative, socialist and/or capitalist monarchy, oligarchy or democracy. The latter talk to how power is divided. The former to how it used.
I don't think you can make such a separation so easily. Legislative power is almost dwarfed by the power of capital. When you have a “liberal democracy”, the two parts are in constant conflict. (I don't mean to say socialist democracy wouldn't have similar problems, just that the structure of power is deeper than just elections.)
These are policy preferences. One can have a liberal, conservative, socialist and/or capitalist monarchy, oligarchy or democracy. The latter talk to how power is divided. The former to how it used.
Naturally, some power divisions tend to lead to certain policy preferences. But that is a correlation
> just trendy neo-feudalist rhetoric
This is the cultural amnesia I'm talking about. These ideas aren't new. From Federalist No. 10:
"From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people."
[1] https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-...