Re:The case of the recursive resolvers: What happened during...
by tptacek on Monday November 29, 2021 @04:43PM
(#29385662)
I mean, I agree with you and don't find the language disingenuous (I felt like it was more of a tell that the people working on this cursed project weren't super read into DNSSEC and DNS security in general, which isn't a knock; it's a boring thing to keep up with, especially when the best-practice answer is so simple --- just don't bother with DNSSEC).
But I'd also say that DoH (1) largely obviates any need for DNSSEC (the last-mile DNS problem is the only on-the-wire DNS security problem that needs solving) and (2) doesn't enable DANE in browsers, which is what people are talking about when they talk about DNSSEC intersecting with browsers in any way other than randomly making sites fall off the Internet.
But I'd also say that DoH (1) largely obviates any need for DNSSEC (the last-mile DNS problem is the only on-the-wire DNS security problem that needs solving) and (2) doesn't enable DANE in browsers, which is what people are talking about when they talk about DNSSEC intersecting with browsers in any way other than randomly making sites fall off the Internet.