Re:Seattle residents launch Approval Voting initiative for r...
by godelski on Friday November 19, 2021 @02:12AM
(#29274612)
> Arrow's impossibility theorem only says that no _ranked_ voting system is perfect
I tend to not get into this fight because 1) it extends to cardinal systems with Gibbard's and 2) Arrow's is more about social choice than voting.
Arrow's impossibility theorem only says that no _ranked_ voting system is perfect, so it doesn't apply to cardinal methods such as Approval or Score.
> That they have some edge conditions that could be theoretically exploited belies that fact that plurality voting (ie, FPTP / one person one vote) is a complete train wreck for spoilers and favoring extreme voting.
I agree, but I think the nature of the exploitation should still be considered. For IRV, we would be introducing a dependence on unauditable voting machines to tabulate votes, which would make it harder to verify the integrity of future elections.