Not all European CAs meet browsers' root programs requirements. Forcing everyone to accept those certs weakens all root programs (Mozilla's, Microsoft's, etc).
There is also the concern that special indicators displayed with a certificate can mislead users. A scummy company with an EV cert isn't any more trustworthy than if they had a DV cert, but browsers want to be careful not to imply a fancy logo makes the site any safer.
That sounds like a huge problem, why should EU trust that USA handles trust certificates well? Of course they would want to regulate this instead of leaving that extremely large security hole open, letting USA alone decide what counts as secure or not is not in EU's interests.
Amusingly, Mozilla rejected the US government's request to add the federal PKI to the root store.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DgJe-Ku4u66JF2D6zha28tSKxPB...
Furthermore, I have seen nothing wrong in mozilla's stewardship of the root certificate program in the decades it's been running, whereas mozilla points to deficiencies in the EU's certificate programs. This is to be expected since running a root store is not one of the EU's specialties. I would trust that government most that defers to private companies in areas where they lack expertise.
Is that really a question to be taken seriously? One is a private organization, completely unaccounted for and in a foreign jurisdiction, who sets their own rules and follows up on themselves.
The other is accountable and audited by independent auditors in a system which upholds separation of power and keeps independent media?
(Just to clarify: Neither Mozilla or anyone else should accept QWAC or any other standard in the face of legitimate concerns, of course. That's not what trust means.)
There is nothing intrinsic to any system of government that would make any of them good at solving technical issues on their own.
It could weaken protection for people in the EU, but then the way forward is to make requirements for root certs mandatory in the EU.
Maybe I missed it, but did the document require special UI elements for EU certs?
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DgJe-Ku4u66JF2D6zha28tSKxPB...
I can't speak with authority, but my reading of PKI issues suggests Google is just as strict, while Microsoft and Apple are less strict. However, that just might be because MS and Apple are less public with their root programs.
For example, QWACs cannot legally be automated (e.g. via ACME), because of certain restrictions applied to needing to validate the natural or legal person making the certificate request. This actually was an issue for one CA (BuyPass) that tried to support ACME but ran afoul of the framework.
While originally QWACs were proposed as optional, regulation such as PSD2 attempts to make them mandatory for (financial services) servers to obtain. If one of those keys is compromised, then the server wishing you obtain a replacement certificate may have to wait weeks to obtain such a certificate, or make an in-person visit to the CA (e.g. the post office).
A considerable number of compromised or misissued certificates have failed to been revoked on the industry-agreed upon timelines (24 hours or 5 days, depending), because of challenges CAs have faced because their customers haven’t (or legally can’t) automate replacement, and because the additional information in the certificate requires manual validation, despite having no technical impact on the TLS connection.
I get QWAC goes against the trend of phasing out EV certs. But isn’t the real issue that the browsers don’t trust TSP audits carried out for EU member states?
Similarly, automation affects how easy or hard it is to replace a CA, for example, if moving to distrust a CA. If you rely on QWAC attributes, you can only use QWAC CAs, and changing CAs becomes significantly more complex.
The audit issue is definitely an issue: the audits used are fundamentally different than what browsers try to achieve, and so having to adopt the lower standard definitely impacts user security. However, my point was that in addition to those concerns, the technical design itself results in less robust and less agile systems, and that makes things less secure.
In some sense, Firefox could be an exception, because Mozilla doesn't seem to do a lot of advertising in the EU.
It is not like Apple, Google, or Microsoft can say: we don't really care about the EU, we just remove the browser from products we distribute (directly or through third parties) in the EU.
But the way I understand it, a QWAC is an identity certificate, issued to users, not to websites. AIUI, websites are to be compelled to accept such user-certs in lieu of a password. Well, I don't see what that has to do with the contents of the root store - that controls the website identities that my browser will accept, not the user-identity that the website accepts.
I read the position paper, but not the regulation. I'd like to see a better explanation of the regulation.
There is an argument why EV should be treated the same a DV I'm not buying that argument but for the moment let's accept it as true.
However, now Mozilla is arguing that EV is less secure than DV. That seems weird to me.
Currently, browsers have root certificates for lots of countries. I can imagine that for a country it becomes a huge problem if suddenly a major browser decides to reject certificates used by that country's government.
Of course, it would be nice if country certificates could be restricted to country specific resources. Maybe mozilla should push for that.