> First, researchers must learn to identify authors of research, and their relationships with industry and with non-profit groups that have specialized agendas. How the tobacco industry paid scientists and physicians to serve as advisers and consultants to undermine the body of evidence pointing to the harms of tobacco is extensively documented. More recent examples abound. For instance, the non-profit International Life Sciences Institute, based in Washington DC and funded by leading companies in the food and chemical industries, promotes doubt about science that links ultraprocessed foods with health concerns, and provides experts to promote personal responsibility rather than regulations on junk food in policies to combat obesity.
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> What we need is scientists who have backbone, who have an unwaivering unaltering desire to get to the truth at all costs.
This is one part of what this article is demanding. It's arguing against efforts of entrenched interests - often businesses - to obscure the truth or make it harder for the general public to tell truth from untruth.
The second part is about taking action. Informing is one part, but at some point courses of action have to be decided - and for many problems, it's not enough to delegate this to individuals, the decision has to be taken on a collective level. Because we will never have 100% knowledge, a certain amount of uncertainty has to be tolerated when deciding on a course.
What this article also argues against is tactics that specifically target this unavoidable amount of uncertainty with the interest of delaying action.
And doing that is not the scientist's job. So scientists should not be filtering what they say because they want to encourage or discourage some course of action. They should just be telling the truth as best they know it.
> for many problems, it's not enough to delegate this to individuals, the decision has to be taken on a collective level.
First, I think the problems for which a collective decision has to be made are much rarer than many people think. Governments have gotten their fingers into all kinds of pies that they don't actually need to be in, but where government intervention serves a special interest.
Second, there isn't just one collective level. There are many of them. As a general rule, you want people who are going to bear the costs and reap the benefits in a particular area to be involved in collective decisions about that area, but you don't want people involved who aren't. That generally means pushing collective decisions down to the lowest possible collective level. But again, our political system very often doesn't do that.
Third, when it comes to collective policy decisions, scientists have no special expertise; they are just citizens like everyone else. Scientists who believe some kind of action is required because of something they found in their scientific research still are only seeing that one narrow viewpoint of their research; that doesn't give them any special ability to see the big picture or to take other interests or factors into account.
> What this article also argues against is tactics that specifically target this unavoidable amount of uncertainty with the interest of delaying action.
Uncertainty can be used either way: it can be used to try to delay action, or to try to motivate it (we don't know whether X will be a problem, but if it is, it will be huge, so we can't take a chance on not doing something about it). Both can be issues.
But this is exactly what the article is arguing for. Often enough industry groups like the tobacco or oil industry were manipulating policy such that they were reaping the benefits while everyone else was bearing the costs.
Those industry groups are already producing biased research. The article argues that more scientists should be ready to expose this bias.
This rule also isn't completely general. Those who bear the costs, those who reap the benefits and those who would be affected by actions might be three different groups. It sometimes can be desirable to make a rule that is applied very broadly to avoid inequities and arbitrage effects. Finally, in global issues such as climate change and COVID, everyone is bearing the costs, so action can't be restricted locally.
> Uncertainty can be used either way: it can be used to try to delay action, or to try to motivate it (we don't know whether X will be a problem, but if it is, it will be huge, so we can't take a chance on not doing something about it). Both can be issues.
Both can be issues, yes. But in the discussed fields, again climate change, COVID, tobacco use, health effects of highly processed food, etc, scientific consensus is by a wide margin that X is both very likely and will deal enormous damage. So uncertainty in that direction is already very small.
That is the whole point of having a transparent debate and looking at falsifiable evidence/tests.
"First, researchers must learn to identify authors of research, and their relationships with industry and with non-profit groups that have specialized agendas."
Conflicts of interest can be useful to know, but this borders on ad hominem. The whole point here is to engage with the argument being made. As I wrote elsewhere, doubt must have a rational basis. If someone is sowing irrational doubt, then you can counter it by showing why it's irrational and unjustified. You can't stop others from spreading manufactured FUD, but you can respond to the FUD by showing that it is FUD.
"Second, scientists should consider what kinds of argument the data and conclusions serve."
So begin with an official narrative and official political ends and advise scientists to refrain from publishing anything that goes against that narrative or those ends? No, thanks.
Also, the author does not seem concerned about the pervasive low trust in our political institutions today and how enacting certain polities feeds into that distrust, even though that concern falls entirely within the bounds of things that she seems to think are worthy of consideration.
Well, they also need to eat. So you'll have to pay them for it, as directly as possible.
The story is used to teach the wisdom of evaluating a plan on not only how desirable the outcome would be but also how it can be executed. It provides a moral lesson about the fundamental difference between ideas and their feasibility, and how this affects the value of a given plan.
Not quite. It's more in the line of identifying potential bad actors to not grant them oportunities to poison the well, waste resources, and outright sabotage progress.
> So you should intentionally bias your results if they don't fit the narrative you wanted?
Not quite. It's more in the line of exercise critical thinking when analysing said work, and there are doubts or extraordinary claims or editorialized nuances (i.e., claims that glasses are half full to undermine and attack findings supporting the emptying glasses theory).
> This gets to the core of the problem. It assumes scientists know the truth and the 'correct' studies.
The job of a scientist consists of gathering data, analising results, and help explain and model phenomena so that we learn more about a subject and understand it better.
As part of this job, experiments are made and reproduced, and observations are reported in studies.
Non-"correct" studies are those that include claims and data that are not credible, reliable, and are outright unbelievable. With enough work, some of those are recanted, but they still cause problems as supporters of fringe theories, conspiracies, and outright lunacy have been known to continue using them to support their wild claims.
As part of this job, experiments are made and reproduced, and observations are reported in studies.
As part of this job in areas where experiments can be done, yes. But in many areas of science, experiments cannot be done. Models can be constructed, but there is no way to validate them with controlled experiments the way you can in, say, particle physics. That means our level of confidence in models in such areas should be reduced; we should not even be saying that such models are "correct", because that level of confidence is simply not justified.
> [1.] researchers must learn to identify authors of research, and their relationships with industry and with non-profit groups that have specialized agendas.
So research is not allowed to be respected by scientists if done with underlying business interests?
> [2.] scientists should consider what kinds of argument the data and conclusions serve.
So you should intentionally bias your results if they don't fit the narrative you wanted?
> [3.] scientists can consistently highlight correct information and avoid serving as inadvertent amplifiers of flawed information
This gets to the core of the problem. It assumes scientists know the truth and the 'correct' studies.
In my experience, my friends with unwise and problematic takes on Covid are almost 100% in the camp that scientists are trying to do the very things this article says they should do!
What we need is scientists who have backbone, who have an unwaivering unaltering desire to get to the truth at all costs. Anything less is both not scientific and not someone you should trust. You won't get the clear answers you want from this individual though.