>Of course, some of economics (e.g., the Austrian school) is overtly driven by a normative ideological agenda rather than pursuing descriptive, empirical science.
This is actually one reason the Austrian school criticises the neoclassical school. The neoclassical school is just as much founded on ideological assumptions as the Austrian school (main difference is cardinal vs ordinal utility), as it's impossible to have a "theory of value" without some underlying philosophical notion of value. However the neoclassical school hides this value system under so many layers of maths in an attempt to convince people it's a real, objective science like physics or chemistry.
There is a form of economics that makes testable predictions with a reasonably high degree of accuracy, and isn't based on any underlying ideology: it's called "quantitative finance".
But mainstream empirical economics, including (but not limited to) the neoclassical school, does not have a theory of value. It makes predictions based on hypotheses of how individuals act given the existence of individual subjective value systems. There are plenty of valid criticisms to be made, but this is just projection by the Austrian school.
You can layer an infinite number of possible idealized value systems on top of any mainstream economic theory to get a policy theory (and there's almost as many of those that have been layered on it as people making policy recommendations incorporating mainstream economic analysis, but that is a separate layer.
> There is a form of economics that makes testable predictions with a reasonably high degree of accuracy, and isn't based on any underlying ideology: it's called "quantitative finance".
QF is to economics as meteorology is to climatology.
It does; it assumes utility exists as some concrete thing that can be compared between individuals. The fact you weren't aware of that just shows how good mainstream economics is at hiding this. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility#Discussion_and_critici...
Can you give an example what could you do to prove me that you do not maximize your utility? I mean, regardless how stupid thing you come up, I can always say "but that's what you chose to do, so that obviously was your preferred course of action and obviously you were then maximizing your utility"
I really hope there is discussion whether rational choice is useful, but the problem is that that discussion does not (yet) descend to the level of MBA economics and below. And that is unfortunately the level where politics are made.
Sometimes I oversleep accidentally, as an obvious example.
Or when I make short-term decisions like being lazy and laying on the couch watching trash, that hurts my long term utility and prevents me from maximizing it.
Or all the times where I'm not smart/awake enough to choose the option that will maximize my utility.
That and other elements of rational choice theory are not unfalsifiable. In fact, some of them were from the outset not merely falsifiable but known false but tentatively held as useful approximations over large populations. In fact, in the scientific part of economics (and other social sciences; rational choice theory has wide impacts), the debate has long been over whether the rational choice model is a still even useful reference point against which to mark variations, given the extensive degree to which it has proven false. (OTOH, a number of higher-level phenomenon predicted by they model have proven predictively useful even though the lower-level model is known false.)
Of course, some of economics (e.g., the Austrian school) is overtly driven by a normative ideological agenda rather than pursuing descriptive, empirical science.