Re:Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem (2012) [pdf]
by YokoZar on Monday October 25, 2021 @03:57PM
(#28992348)
The "theoretically possible" case of voters having cyclic preferences is actually quite reasonable! A rock-paper-scissors situation among the top 3 candidates doesn't require irrational voters or anything of the sort: all you need is for there to be at least 2 issues.
This is the rational response to Arrow's theorem - not to cynically conclude all voting systems are "bad", or that "dictatorship" makes some sort of sense, but rather just to say that if there's a rock-paper-scissors situation among the top candidates, one of them should win.
The page member rfreytag indicates, https://mises.org/wire/arrows-impossibility-theorem-exposes-... , has a very good explanation.
Edit: I realize there could be another (suggestive) way to express it: at least in the (theoretically possible) cases where preferences show a cyclic pattern (when similar numbers of voters claim A>B>C, C>A>B, B>C>A), there is no """optimal""" way to determine a collective preference.
Edit: there is again another nice way to express it - member ajennings shows it at the end of his video (see nearby) with a simulation: if when all voters express preference for an option the outcome reflects that ("unanimity"), and we take a decision in the controversial scenarios, and we demand that the collective preference between two alternatives will be a function of the preferences individual voters claim about those two alternatives ("relevance"), then one ordered list of preferences will make the others uninfluent ("dictatorship").