Unfortunately, key management is still a difficult problem. Without secure keys, even the most secure encryption becomes nothing more than an inconvenience.
You seem to be thinking that when I say "implement", I mean, "building an AES core library from scratch". No. I mean properly using a well tested, totally sound AES library in a way that doesn't leave your application totally boned.
I'm happy to say that systems which try to generate random passwords do tend to generate securely random passwords, though. /dev/random has been a huge help there.
I'm just saying that key management is absolutely not a solved problem yet.
And note that SSL download public keys over insecure networks. Verifying them is why certificates were created
You know this.
What I did was come up with the simplest, most reliable key management system there is (static keying with secure keys), and presumed it to be safe.
Then I pointed out that such an application is still likely to be boned by implementation flaws that have nothing to do with how the keys are established.
Can you please fix the images on your blog post about that :)
Wish I could up vote you twice for this.
Part of that was the cost of getting rid of years of cruft, though. Dropping in a new block cipher which operates on 128-bit blocks using 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys would probably be much cheaper.
There is no need to hurry.
For Hacker News, the far more important thing to point out is that no matter what block cipher you use, you are never going to get burnt by research like this, but you are almost certain to be completely boned by implementation errors.