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Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by tptacek on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @07:51PM (#2897414)
The total cost to the industry of adopting AES was enormous. That implies that deprecating it would at present impose costs that far outweigh the benefits, because replacing AES will be expensive, and there are at present minimal practical benefits to doing so. Remember, plenty of critical systems have been fielded that rely on RC4 and DES-EDE, both of which are also (for all intents and purposes) unbroken in their most common usage.

For Hacker News, the far more important thing to point out is that no matter what block cipher you use, you are never going to get burnt by research like this, but you are almost certain to be completely boned by implementation errors.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by quanticle on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @08:44PM (#2897518)
I would consider key management to be a greater problem than implementation, at this point. There are many verified, open-source, freely-licensed cryptography libraries out there. You shouldn't be rolling your own implementation.

Unfortunately, key management is still a difficult problem. Without secure keys, even the most secure encryption becomes nothing more than an inconvenience.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by tptacek on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @08:50PM (#2897538)
Everyone says this, because Applied Cryptography (not a good book) says it. But no, the problem of coming up with a good 128 bit or 256 bit key is not the hardest part of getting a cryptosystem working. Plenty of static-keyed systems, in which keys are more or less guaranteed to come from /dev/random, end up totally busted.

You seem to be thinking that when I say "implement", I mean, "building an AES core library from scratch". No. I mean properly using a well tested, totally sound AES library in a way that doesn't leave your application totally boned.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by cperciva on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @10:16PM (#2897717)
I've seen a lot of broken key management. People using MD5(passphrase) (cough OpenSSH cough) as a key, people downloading public keys over insecure networks and not verifying them at all, people distributing secret keys along with software destined to be run on hostile systems...

I'm happy to say that systems which try to generate random passwords do tend to generate securely random passwords, though. /dev/random has been a huge help there.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by tptacek on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @10:58PM (#2897790)
You wouldn't want to leave anyone with the impression that they're mostly fine as long as their keys are securely generated.
Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by cperciva on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @11:49PM (#2897887)
No, of course not. That's why I work so hard to point out the ways that people get crypto wrong (and how to do it right).

I'm just saying that key management is absolutely not a solved problem yet.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by tptacek on Thursday August 18, 2011 @12:13AM (#2897919)
Yeah yeah, not arguing, just wanted us both on the record on this point. Crypto: dangerous.
Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by yuhong on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @10:54PM (#2897783)
>people downloading public keys over insecure networks and not verifying them at all

And note that SSL download public keys over insecure networks. Verifying them is why certificates were created

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by waitwhat on Thursday August 18, 2011 @04:11AM (#2898398)
Come on, "coming up with a good 128 bit or 256 bit key" is only a very small part of key management (and, as you note, probably also the easiest part of key management).

You know this.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by tptacek on Thursday August 18, 2011 @02:23PM (#2900396)
You misunderstood me.

What I did was come up with the simplest, most reliable key management system there is (static keying with secure keys), and presumed it to be safe.

Then I pointed out that such an application is still likely to be boned by implementation flaws that have nothing to do with how the keys are established.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by bonzoesc on Thursday August 18, 2011 @12:51AM (#2898008)
> You seem to be thinking that when I say "implement", I mean, "building an AES core library from scratch". No. I mean properly using a well tested, totally sound AES library in a way that doesn't leave your application totally boned.

Can you please fix the images on your blog post about that :)

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by gchpaco on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @08:43PM (#2897517)
For Hacker News, the far more important thing to point out is that no matter what block cipher you use, you are never going to get burnt by research like this, but you are almost certain to be completely boned by implementation errors.

Wish I could up vote you twice for this.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by cperciva on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @10:08PM (#2897701)
The total cost to the industry of adopting AES was enormous

Part of that was the cost of getting rid of years of cruft, though. Dropping in a new block cipher which operates on 128-bit blocks using 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys would probably be much cheaper.

Re:Researchers identify first flaws in AES by xilun0 on Wednesday August 17, 2011 @08:40PM (#2897512)
one should also note that even if we take a fantasist hypothesis of a major breakthrough demonstrating a loose of strength of 2 bits for AES-128 once a year during ten years, we would probably still have tens of years to replace the cipher. Of course this theory is full baseless hypotheses, but even more is the theory that would says that there is a risk of a major breakthrough tomorrow reducing the strength of AES-128 to 64-bits.

There is no need to hurry.