The problem of linking different "facts" and actions is ancient and has a plain solution: the politician applies the weighs of different interests according to the relative power behind those interests (including tactical or strategical considerations about the consequences). I am not sure that to call those interests «moral values» is actually healthy.
One issue we cannot disregard is that not only facts can be tentative: the main issue we have is with tentative solutions - it is more with guessing which solution will be effective (its estimated consequences get weighed according to the interests in order to rank the proposal) than to decide which interpretation of the world is more adequate.
Edit: anyway, Bratton seems to be fully aware and explicit in considering that "fact are less of an issue than solutions" and that "said solutions are to be calibrated subjectively, politically - since an "objective", all-encompassing algorithm is out of reach".
Just because two sets of people have different values doesn't mean one value isn't clearly better than the other. You and I can disagree on something like whether human life has value, but the one who holds it to have value is likely to have a lot more support.
Did postmodernism get redefined to mean anyone who doesn't believe in moral facts?
https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-philosophy/Foucau...
But that's a far cry from how postmodernism is often decried, as something that professes no objective truth at all, or as a bunch of lazy moral relativism, where the value itself changes depending on circumstance.
So you can easily have two people fighting about postmodernism that might even largely agree with each other; that they dislike moral relativism. But one would attack post-modernism, and the other would defend it, neither really quite clear what they are actually talking about. Which seems to be another definition of postmodernism itself.
Anyway. :) Back to your original question. Given the absence of actual moral facts (which I take as axiomatic), I think the answer is limited to some public decision process that decides which moral values are in force, along with an effective way to re-decide frequently in a way that avoids the problems of becoming insular and self-reinforcing.
The solution is not to restrict the existence of models/algorithms/facts, but to make explicit the moral values they are combined with when determining policy.
The problem is that the models and algorithms are so complex and sizzly that it can make it more difficult to tease out the implicit moral values that are embedded in the policies that use them.