Re:SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
by whoisburbansky on Tuesday October 12, 2021 @06:13PM
(#28845694)
What do you mean by the `bis` and `cis` suffixes to your entry labels?
Re:SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
by lvh on Tuesday October 12, 2021 @06:14PM
(#28845708)
It's just a subdivision; it might as well have said 1a, 1b... -- but "bis" and "cis/tris" (and possibly tetrakis) tend to emphasize that they're addenda, not equal points.
Re:SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
by schoen on Tuesday October 12, 2021 @08:22PM
(#28846751)
It should normally be "bis" and "ter".
The Latin for "once, twice, thrice, four times, five times" is "semel, bis, ter, quater, quinquies". ("Bis" and "ter" are the only really short ones.)
It's moderately common in European standards and bureaucracy to use "bis" and "ter" for "version/revision 2" and "version/revision 3", respectively. For example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ITU-T_V-series_recomme...
Re:SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
by lvh on Tuesday October 12, 2021 @08:58PM
(#28847009)
Huh, good point; I wonder if my mind mixed up the org chem with the numbers (likely) or if that's some kind of unique Belgian affectation.
Re:SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)
by whoisburbansky on Tuesday October 12, 2021 @06:54PM
(#28846122)
Ah, gotcha. I thought I recognized the prefixes from Organic, but I don't think I've seen it used like this here. Neat!
1bis) You can use an existing collision to create new collisions. People seem to think you need to generate all the work again from scratch; this is not true. See PoC||GTFO for proof by example.
1cis) The files do not need to be gigantic. See PoC||GTFO for proof by example.
2) You can do the collision in advance, and publish the malicious version later. What it accomplishes is that the concept of "this Git hash unambiguously specifies a revision" no longer works, and one of them can be malicious.
3) The standard should be "obviously safe beyond a reasonable doubt", not "not obviously unsafe to a non-expert". By the latter standard, pretty much any random encryption construction is fine. (The examples I gave use MD5, not SHA-1, but that's a matter of degrees.)
4) SHA-256 was published years before git first was.