Re:YubiKey Bio Series
by jiveturkey on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @08:36PM
(#28767665)
Your question implies that the yubikey is an HSM. It isn't. It has a secure element.
If you want to implement your own novel test of user presence, you could get an F-Secure USB armory device (https://www.f-secure.com/en/consulting/foundry/usb-armory) and tap into the GPIO.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series
by FuriouslyAdrift on Wednesday October 06, 2021 @09:48AM
(#28773162)
Yubico does, however, make an actual HSM.
https://www.yubico.com/products/hardware-security-module/
Re:YubiKey Bio Series
by jiveturkey on Wednesday October 06, 2021 @03:03PM
(#28776928)
by name only. it is also not an HSM by commonly understood definition. epoxied chip isn't enough to declare HSM-ness
Re:YubiKey Bio Series
by FuriouslyAdrift on Monday October 11, 2021 @06:38PM
(#28833881)
I was on a team that evaled it for FIPS compliance. It's a full, FIPS compliant, HSM. It's $650 but that's still on the low side for an HSM.
Trezor - I've been using one for years and it's great. Also you can backup/restore the seed (so you don't need to register multiple devices).
I just ran across this comment, and realized it also works with gpg. I really wish yubikeys supported this backup mechanism as well (given their size), but I'm very tempted to make the jump.
I haven’t used yubikeys in a while, and they never supported backups, but they did support key import for GPG when I used them — so you can make a key some other way, and then put it on as many yuvikeys as you care to.
Isn’t that enough for your use case?
That's actually the process I use right now. The problem is that it relies upon an old laptop and several usb keys for backup. It's much easier to backup 24 words on a sheet of paper than a full gpg key.
Plus, those 24 words can also recover your u2f keys, crypto wallets, etc. The 24 word backup is something crypto has gotten right that I wish private key setups would replicate.
> Trezor - I've been using one for years and it's great. Also you can backup/restore the seed (so you don't need to register multiple devices).
Trezor does not make use of a secure element https://blog.trezor.io/is-banking-grade-security-good-enough...
I don't know the details but it doesn't sound great if you can exfiltrate secret material – the seed? – from a device.
A good smartcard should generate its own keys, on device, and only divulge them when persuaded to do so by an electron microscope.
You can't exfiltrate it - you can generate a seed externally and load it in, and back it up if you choose.
You can extract the seed, clone it into a new device, and get the exact same device with the same private key material?
Re:YubiKey Bio Series
by ThePowerOfFuet on Wednesday October 06, 2021 @07:12PM
(#28779658)
Yes, but you can extract it only once; the device will refuse to provide it if it's already been provided.
I feel I am 10,000x more likely to be attacked from inside my computer by a digital intruder than from any other vector. I lock my Yubikeys with a PIN but I’m not convinced it really protects me against anything that might actually happen to me. Jason Bourne, I am not.
If you, on the other hand, face targeted physical threats on the daily then you have my sympathies. Stay safe.
(Ps: any recommendations for an HSM with a more exciting presence check? I’d like to shoot a hoop / shoot a tin can / shoot a shot of wheatgrass every time I log in, rather than just press an ambiguously hello/green blinky light.)