But you have two independent VPNs right, using different technologies on different internet handoffs in very different parts of your network, right?

Fundamentally, how is a 2nd independent VPN into your network a different attack surface than a single, well-secured ssh jumphost? When you're using them for narrow emergency access to restore the primary VPN, both are just "one thing" listening on the wire, and it's not like ssh isn't a well-understood commodity.

Zero day sshd vulnerability would be bad.

On the other hand if you had to break through wireguard first, and then go through your single well-secured bastion, you'd not only be harder to find, you'd have two layers of protection, and of course you tick the "VPN" box

Vpn can also have a zero day, and seems about as likely?

But if your vpn has a zero day, that lets you get to the ssh server. It's two layers of protection, you'd have to have two zero days to get in instead of one.

You could argue it's overkill, but it's clearly more secure

Only if the VPN means you have a VPN and a jump box. If it's "VPN with direct access to several servers and no jump box" there's still only one layer to compromise.

Still wouldn't help if your configuration change wipes you clear off the Internet like Facebook's apparently has. The only way to have a completely separate backup is to have a way in that doesn't rely on "your network" at all.

Your OOB network wouldn't be affected by changes to your main network