> This issue was caused by our own change and not related to any third-party DNS software and services.
Edited to add, e.g. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22400167
> DNSSEC is moribund and almost nobody uses it; in reality, the DNSSEC root private keys could land on Pastebin tomorrow and nothing would "break"
We have this whole thread here about a "service disruption" for Slack, and nobody leaked the "root private keys" just one person made a dumb error and it blew up their site.
yeah, the dumb error they made was "using DNSSEC"
But, some governments are requiring DNSSEC, which regardless of its usefulness, puts companies that want those contracts in a bit of a bind.
Perhaps it would make sense to split domains such that DNSSEC guarded ones would not negatively impact ones that do not have DNSSEC.
The important top-line thing to know here is that virtually all tech companies eschew DNSSEC (you can verify that for yourself with `host -t ds stripe.com`; substitute any other company for Stripe.
DNSSEC-quarantine TLDs are a good idea.
> M-08-23, Securing the Federal Government's Domain Name System Infrastructure (August 22, 2008)
> OMB is rescinding memorandum M-08-23, which provides additional guidance on the Domain Name System (DNS), specifically focusing on new security protections for the Federal DNS. The requirements in this memorandum are outdated; agencies already should have implemented these security protections.
What this suggests is that Slack, for reasons passing understanding, enabled DNSSEC on their zones (with a DS record that essentially turns DNSSEC on, and the accompanying key records) --- then disabled DNSSEC by pulling all the records. But the DS records are in caches; validating resolvers go looking for the keys, which don't exist, and say "welp, I guess Slack.com doesn't exist".