How do you go from computation to feeling a toothache?
It's like telling me a cucumber is really a Porsche (but worse).
Pain/pleasure seem to have easy enough analogue to at least something like a reward function, but what really gets me is colors. I feel like if honestly considered, the word "color" is all that's necessary to disprove materialism. Color is. How? Dunno.
I agree with the latter, but the former? Classical Newtonian mechanics is easy enough to imagine.
What baffles me a bit is that quantum mechanics seems to be linear, but we seem to see chaos in the real world. (And exactly that (mathematical) chaos is also what the article exploits.)
See eg https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/33344/is-the-uni... for a discussion, and https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/island.pdf for a longer treatment.
One universe has "observer" (a bunch of variables, really) in one state, another has it in different state. Those variables encode some information about themselves, so indeed in different universes the different "versions" of the observer are different, and each perceive it as universe randomly deciding to chose their version of existence. So what?
We're parts of the physical reality so trying to describing physics from the point of view of an out-of-universe observer, while psychologically attractive, is ultimately futile: in QM, such approach breaks very quickly.
I'm not sure whether eg the Born rule is enough by itself to explain how (non-linear) chaos arises from linear QM.
no algorithm running on a cpu can move a muscle --
it is precisely that movement is a spatiotemporal property which means no turing machine can realise it
movement isn't a symbolic operation
If you are making a broader claim about the limits of hardware vs. wetware the you will need to clarify things a bit further.
But that doesn't mean brains aren't special -- it means brains are special and computers are special. Even more: it seems to imply computers, AI, etc. can be as special as ourselves, sentient, and perhaps even more special in ways we haven't realized yet.
It's difficult to even imagine a physical theory with unbounded local information. It seems to open the possibility to crazy things like hypercomputation, which do not seem very well defined. (For example: every 1-1/n seconds, (n>1) from now, flip a switch ON/OFF. At what state will the switch be at t>1s? An at exactly t=1s?)
Note: while information and information flow itself bounded (hence no hypercomputation), I don't know of any obvious objections to continuous time. (I'm not sure the continuity of time has any profound implications)