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Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by FooBarWidget on Saturday September 25, 2021 @02:30AM (#28650980)
The existence of censorship is pretty well-known among Chinese. You saw it as much in that Weixin article that I sent you.

But I believe the role of censorship is mischaracterized because westerners reason from their own history, experience and values, not from the Chinese perspective. Whereas from the western perspective censorship and information control are mortal sins, from the Chinese perspective it's a lot more complicated, considered both good and bad.

There are 3 aspects of Chinese culture that tie into this view:

1. Talk is considered cheap, what you do is more important

2. Respect for authority

3. Outcome legitimacy vs procedural legitimacy

Aspect 1: You see this by the fact that Chinese tend to be much more humble than e.g. Americans — Chinese don't talk about how great they are, they put down their heads and do the job. This characteristic reflects all the way back to the government: in general, the Chinese government is bad at explaining and marketing themselves, and they tend to focus on execution. Hence why Chinese propaganda is so horrendously bad, especially from the western perspective.

Aspect 2: One does not talk bad about one's parents and boss. Not talking bad about the government is an extension of that. Chinese view the relationship between employee-boss and citizen-government as analogous to child-parent. Not exactly the same, but similar enough as far as respect for authority goes. It's not just a matter of "CCP punishes dissent" (a statement which by itself is also mischaracterized).

Aspect 3: We in the west focus on the process of government selection as a measure of legitimacy. To Chinese, whether the government actually delivers good results that benefit the people, is considered the right measure of legitimacy. A voted-in government that does not deliver is considered illegitimate. A dictator that took power by force, but works for the interest of the people, is considered legitimate.

When combining all 3 aspects, censorship and information control are not considered a sin. They are tools. The outcome of using these tools matters much more.

The mainstream western view is that Chinese censorship is meant to suppress dissent and to glorify the party. But research by Harvard shows that this is not true: "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression" https://gking.harvard.edu/publications/how-censorship-china-...

This paper states that censorship's main role is to cool down controversies and to suppress collective action, no matter whether those controversies/collective actions are pro- or anti-government. In fact, the paper is very clear about the fact that anti-government messages are not censored as long as they don't cause a stir, while pro-government messages are censored if they become too popular and run the risk of getting a life of its own.

Why does censorship behave like this? Consider that as little as 30 years ago, the past 150 years or so have been absolutely horrendous. Foreign imperial powers walked all over China, looting the country (gunboat diplomacy), literally putting people on drugs (Opium Wars), stealing territory, and in case of the Japanese during WW2, even mass killing and raping. There was poverty, famine and political instability which lasted well until the late 60s. This chaos has raged on for so long, it has become collective memory. Some of it is still in living memory: my grandma (who is still alive) told me tales of fleeing from the Japanese.

Thus to Chinese, social stability and freedom from poverty matter more than anything else. When you are poor, you are not free, no matter how much you can vote. After the Cultural Revolution, people became tired of revolution.

By and large, the Chinese people view unity as an important goal to pursue. On the one hand, it's part of people's identity as Chinese: Chinese history has always tended towards unity. On a more practical level, both ancient and modern Chinese history has shown that times of disunity are chaotic and are correlated with all manners of bad outcomes: wars, famines, corruption. More recently they've learned that being disunited means weakness: the inability to resist foreign imperial powers who are out to exploit China. People are tired of all those bad outcomes that have plagued China for so long.

The government views censorship as a tool to aid in unity and social stability. There are positive outcomes of censorship that are never mentioned in the west:

- Censorship is used to suppress incitement of ethnic hatred. In the US after 9/11, racist attacks against Muslims or anyone Middle-Eastern-looking spiked. In China, there have been many major terrorist attacks by ETIM. Terrorists set off bombs, walked around with machetes, drove cars into crowds — killing innocent Han and Uyghurs alike. This information was censored in order to prevent Han from hating on innocent Uyghurs. Only recently has censorship on this information been lifted.

- Censorship is also used in the context of China's foreign policy of non-interference. Here's a concrete example. One of the prominent pushers of the Uyghur genocide narrative, is Adrien Zenz. There are many critics of Adrien Zenz's work. One such critic is Jerry Grey, an Australian who has been living in China for over a decade and who has visited Xinjiang many times. He published an article in Chinese media, criticizing Zenz's research methodology as being unsound, and inviting Zenz to come over to Xinjiang to take a look for himself (Zenz has never visited Xinjiang). His article was censored because according to China's foreign policy, it's not China's place to encourage others to change their minds. https://twitter.com/Jerry_grey2002/status/131872917977329664...

Whether censorship succeeds in this goal is a whole different discussion. I personally think that the people who head the censorship department are too old, too conservative/careful and too out-of-touch with modern society.

In the context of western mainstream media misinformation about China, there are Chinese who, after climbing the firewall, have gained an appreciation for censorship and the firewall. They hypothesize that one of the reasons why the firewall exists, is because the Chinese government knows it cannot compete with foreign propaganda, which is much more sophisticated. The Chinese government is neither good at explaining themselves nor good at selling themselves with pretty rhetoric. Which means that the firewall is a defensive measure, rather than an offensive measure meant to punish/attack the citizen.

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by toss1 on Saturday September 25, 2021 @04:49PM (#28656089)
Excellent exposition, thanks!

>>censorship's main role is to cool down controversies and to suppress collective action, no matter whether those controversies/collective actions are pro- or anti-government. ... while pro-government messages are censored if they become too popular and run the risk of getting a life of its own.

This really strikes me as a key element. I've noticed anti-govt sentiments expressed within/from China, and the apparent paradox of them being allowed to exist, and also noted that the main thrust of CCP action was against movements, not comments. It makes sense, both as a practical need to focus the work of managing society, and strategically, that they see that they cannot allow any other movement to grow, hence suppression/management starting at organized religion, and anything else that gets viral or organized. In this sense, it is easily seen as a defensive measure, both internally and externally, trying to prevent anything from growing to another concentration of power.

Interesting perspective on the collective motivating trauma. It almost seems that for the Chinese, it was poverty and being overrun by outside forces, for the westerners, especially Americans, it was excessive govt -- the US was literally founded by those escaping govt persecution. So the core motivating fears are at the opposite end of the spectrum.

I like your distinction on the process/results legitimacy/illegitimacy views; it certainly shows how Chinese can see their govt as legitimate. and the CCP has largely delivered increasing prosperity for the last decades. However, when the govt fails to deliver, how does that get fixed? In (functioning) democracies, a govt that fails to deliver even a little bit gets voted out. In China, it seems the only choice would be to endure a non-delivering govt, or a new revolution...

Churchill's comment comes to mind: "Democracy is the worst form of govt, except for all others.". The best, while it lasts, is a benign dictatorship where the leader is successfully working for the people. The problem is that nothing guarantees the success or motivation.

How do they plan to ensure succession and that the party works for the people, successfully? It seems that the anti-corruption push might be a good thing, but from here, I have no idea if that was genuinely rooting out corruption, or consolidating power, or both. (They certainly seem to have little control of shadow banking, etc., which could be an existential threat).

Also interesting and a bit funny that the Party sees that it can't compete with western media. Not surprising, but not evident from here either until you mentioned it (I'd be pretty intimidated too). Considering that the firewall is generally known and accepted, how easy and common is it to evade it? Can everyone do it trivially, or does it take a lot of effort? What are typical penalties and how, and how often, are they enforced? What is the result - is discussion of yesterday's Financial Times, New York Times, Washington Post, etc. common, occasional, or all underground, or does no one care about them?

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by FooBarWidget on Sunday September 26, 2021 @06:04AM (#28659657)
(part 2) So, back to your question of how to ensure that the system keeps working for the people. The answer is two-fold:

1. Meritocracy. Many believe that proving yourself for 30 years is a better way to select for a good leader (and prevent the selection of a bad leader) than voting through popularity.

2. Active solicitation and being responsive to protests (!)

This latter probably sounds very surprising. Consider this: freedom is expression is not necessarily correlated with results. In many western countries, we talk about all sorts of things, but politicians don't deliver.

The inverse is also true: censorship does not necessarily correlate with not delivery results. China censors from time to time, but at the same time they actively listen to (and address) grievances. In the past 15 years or so, they've developed a robust monitoring & feedback system to find social issues and address grievances. They make extensive use of polls. They monitor social media. There are official channels for sending feedback. Both the feedback and the replies by government officials are published for the public for read. There are 16000 (!) protests in China each year — not to protest against the government, but to ask the government to address their grievances. Censorship happens in parallel to all of this. See also:

- A thread about monitoring & feedback systems: https://twitter.com/willehelmwonka/status/130976009462460006...

- Expat Cyrus Janssen, who has lived in China for many years: speaks about how the government listens to protests and is very active in addressing grievances. He gives concrete examples of recent social issues that have been addressed as a result of widespread protests. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqcScSCTgbM

- "Why protests are so common in China": https://www.economist.com/china/2018/10/04/why-protests-are-...

- "How to legally protest in China": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VKRQQkq51I TLDR: protest, but don't incite ethnic hatred, don't incite overthrow of government

Another concrete example: there were large-scale protests in Guangdong in 2019 over the a crematorium plans. This raged on for days. In the end, the government gave in to the demands of the protesters. Very few people were arrested, and of the arrested people a few were quickly released. https://mothership.sg/2019/12/news-china-protests-wenlou-hua...

What happens if a bad president does get elected? It'll certainly be harder to oust him than in western democracies, but it's not impossible. The president is not elected by the NPC, but it's elected by the Central Committee. This is one of the highest political bodies, consisting of other high officials that climbed their way up through the meritocracy ladder. The president can be voted out by this body, just not directly by the people. Furthermore the president doesn't make decisions by himself, but together with other top officials, so it's not accurate to say that the president is a dictator.

Neither the western system nor the Chinese system are perfect. Each one has its own merits and problems. Many western countries are suffering from decreased trust nowadays. Despite the fact that the government can be replaced, many social issues are never solved. In China one can say that the opposite is true: you can't replace the president but social issues are solved all the time.

With regards to your comment on power & corruption: there is the issue of regulatory capture and state capture by entrenched interests. These interests can't be voted out, but they are a big reason why government changes so often yet few things get resolved. It doesn't appear that democracy have a good answer to this yet.

The Chinese government is also worried about capture by entrenched interests. Xi Jingping's anti-corruption campaign is both a real campaign to root out corruption (with great results), as well as a power-consolidation move. This latter does not have to be a bad if you consider that it's necessary in order to defeat entrenched interests which hold the country back. Chinese leadership believes that entrenched interests which do not work for the benfit of the people is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union failed. See this analysis by Kevin Tellier, expert on China matters: https://twitter.com/kevtellier/status/1441774309652025346

The Chinese system is also constantly evolving. The CCP, and the system from 30 years ago, is very different from how they are today. There are constantly new reforms. For example the whole meritocracy thing is relatively new: it was introduced in the 90s. The monitoring & feedback system only really took off in the past 15 years or so. These are key aspects that are often overlooked by China watchers.

I'd say the Chinese system and western systems can learn a lot from each other. And China is learning from the west all the time. Unfortunately it seems the other way around doesn't happen that much because many people don't see China for what it is, but only for what they think it is.

--

Regarding VPNs: yes it's easy. Every time I visit China I buy a VPN subscription before I enter the country. It works fine even though connectivity can be flaky. On my last visit in early 2020 I even setup my own Wireguard server.

I haven't figured out how to get a VPN working after you enter China, but it's evidently pretty easy if I look at how many people from China are on Twitter, Youtube and Quora. There are various vloggers in China that publish to Youtube.

Here's what I understand about the legality of VPN. The Dutch have a "gedoogbeleid" against soft drugs, which means that soft drugs are officially illegal, but the government chooses not to enforce punishment against owning soft drugs. I believe China's position regarding VPN is similar. From time to time they close down VPN providers but by and large they don't go after VPN users.

I've heard of a story where a police officer notices that a citizen has a VPN installed on his phone. The police officer then confiscated his phone. Later on, that officer's superior apologized to the citizen and gave back his phone, saying that his junior is new and doesn't understand China's laws very well yet.

If someone is arrested for VPN'ing then it's usually tied to something else, such as high-level political dissent. From what I understand, you don't get arrested just for dissent: you'll have to be on the level of Julian Assange in order to really get in trouble.

Businesses can apply for a VPN license if they need to avoid the firewall in order to do business with foreign countries.

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by FooBarWidget on Sunday September 26, 2021 @06:04AM (#28659656)
(Part 1) Okay this is complicated to explain to a western perspective so I have to split my answer in multiple parts.

First, about China's political system. China is often described as totalitarian or a dictatorship. And certainly there is less political freedom than in many western countries. But "totalitarian/dictatorship" doesn't accurately describe it: it's better described as a political meritocracy. China's system has:

- representation

- voting (in a hierarchical manner)

- consultation of the people (this one has become very big nowadays)

- multiple parties (though CCP leads the pack, the other parties aren't empty zombies either)

This interview with professor Daniel A. Bell, dean at School of Political Science and Public Administration of Shandong University, explains how the system works: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_ZzlPoapB4 (full disclosure: interview by CGTN, Chinese state media) At 13:30 he explains why it makes no sense to lump China together with the likes of North Korea and Saudi Arabia.

An important distinction between the Chinese system and western systems, is that there is no separation of powers ala Trias Politica, in which different bodies and parties limit each others' power. Instead, the Chinese system is much more about collaboration, while at the same time the CCP stays firmly in power. A forced unity, if you will.

China's voting system is hierarchical. People vote for a representative at the village level. Those representatives vote for even higher levels. Here is a first-hand account by David Fishman, who is an expert on China's energy sector. https://twitter.com/pretentiouswhat/status/14283977611420180... During his holidays he met a village leader who has 90% election approval rating because he works hard for the benefit of his village. This thread describes how that village leader works, and how this village leader's attitude differs from higher-level governors that tend to be careerists. Fishman also says that in the next village, local democracy has unfortunately not resulted in a good representative.

Voting bubbles up to the top legislative body, the National People's Congress (NPC). This body makes national laws. Here is a good explanation video by Einar Tangen, political commentator who advised US, South Korean and Chinese governments (again full disclosure: he's hosted by CGTN): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CpiLcLOTSg

The NPC actively consults lower levels, all the way down to the village level. For example, all new proposals are published through newspapers and people are solicted for opinions. See also this thread: https://twitter.com/thinking_panda/status/120804266113685094...

There are 8 parties in China. But their relationship is not antagonistic, i.e. they don't fight for which party gets in power. The voting system selects representatives (people), not parties. The NPC consists of people from multiple parties, though in practice the CCP is the biggest party.

Government officials (including the president) are not selected through voting, but through meritocracy. They are promoted to a higher level (e.g. city -> provincial) based on how well they perform against KPIs. Promotion comes with relocation so that you get to experience (and must prove yourself in) different contexts: governing Shanghai is very different from governing the province of Guangdong.

This ties in with the "talk is cheap" concept: rather than selecting based on popularity, people would rather see that you prove yourself for 30 years and that you're not full of shit. Xi Jingping began as a village official, he literally had to work in poop (installing a methane tank in a village) early in his multi-decade career. Here are two interesting threads which describe the promotion process: https://twitter.com/thinking_panda/status/130578464126202675... (a general description) and https://twitter.com/thinking_panda/status/130699111582069555... (a case study of Hu Chunhua's career, who's the vice premier)

This is why Fishman talks about "careerists". Sometimes the interests of the province-level governor's career conflict with the interests of the local village.

So the NPC is similar to a parliament. Unlike western parliaments, the NPC's role is not to keep the power of the executive body in check, i.e. they can't oust the president (formally they can but there are technicalities why in practice they can't). Instead, the executive body and the legislative body collaborate more closely than in western systems. In western systems, politicians make proposals as an expression of ideology, and politicians do not have to be qualified in terms of skill or experience. It's the bureaucrats' jobs to implement new ideas. In the Chinese system, politicians consult bureaucrats a lot more, and decisions are made in collaboration rather than "thrown over the wall".

As I said, the CCP is the largest party and the NPC can't oust the CCP president. But that doesn't mean the CCP deprives non-CCP members from having a say. They have a body called the CPPCC (Political Consultative Conference) through which they actively consult non-CCP members (so people who either belong to other parties, or don't have an affiliation with any party) for political advice. Even though it "merely" has an advisory role and does not have binding powers, the CCP actively makes use of this body for advice on major political and social issues.

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by toss1 on Monday September 27, 2021 @01:55PM (#28673872)
This is a lot of good information you provided and makes a good case for the CCP perhaps being legitimate, or perhaps least-illegitimate govt available given Chinese realities. I'll read up on the references you provided. Like anything, it is not universally bad, and there are many good things it does, and the meritocracy sounds great as you describe it. And the cooperation between the bureaucracy and politicians also sounds way more effective than things are often done in the west.

Yet the 8 parties with a non-adversarial relationship sounds like standard authoritarian controlled opposition.

Plus, there remain many problems both internally and on the international stage.

Internally, you make clear that the goal isn't 100% censorship, but only suppressing anything that might become a movement of it's own, even if apparently favorable to the CCP. And suppressing news that might turn to racist acts against Uyghurs is not a bad thing to do. Yet we still have 'forced reeducation' of a million of them. We still have the 6 year-old Panchin Lama and his family being disappeared 3 days after being recognized by Buddhist religious authorities, and a new CCP-appointed person announced, along with many actions to dilute Tibetean Buddhism. This is straight-up cultural genocide, designed to wipe out a culture in a generation.

We also have many wholly unjustified claims of sovereignity in international waters, islands, and Taiwan, for example. They blatantly violate the Hong Kong transfer agreements only a few years after they start.

You need only skim the Human Rights Watch reports [1] to see a litany of problems, all systematic, and not one-offs. Not to mention efforts to silence people abroad [2].

They say "don't interfere in our internal affairs" which sounds fine, except that they are actively attempting to annex and eliminate their neighbors.

And sure, if they've done so many good works, maybe they could win an election. But since they never put it to the test, I'm still not sure I could call it legitimate.

If they didn't have the systematic internal human rights oppression, and systematic international expansionism, I could see it as a legit alternative... but there are these core systematic problems underlying all the good stuff.

[1] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china...

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/jan/15/orwellian-china-...

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by FooBarWidget on Tuesday September 28, 2021 @04:49AM (#28680604)
(Part 2) Man, I wish I could edit comments older than a few hours. I don't think I've explained the second half of my previous comment (about Tiananmen) in the best way.

I believe Tiananmen is better characterized as follows:

- The economic reforms in the late 1970s towards more privatization and more market economy, resulted in economic disruptions. Food prices and unemployment surged. People were unhappy.

- Young people (students) bought into the idea that the problems are caused by a lack of western liberal democracy. They started protesting, but they didn't understand how governance worked so their demands were very messy.

- The leadership still remembered the 1960s Cultural Revolution, during which the government was effectively overthrown and there was anarchy everywhere. As the protests raged on without clear demands and without clear conclusion, and also becoming increasingly chaotic, the leadership feared a new Cultural Revolution.

- The leadership all had military backgrounds (out of necessity, because of WW2, Vietnam War, Korean War). They didn't know how to properly deal with civilian protests. China also had no organization to deal with civilian unrest (no riot police) and no riot gear (like rubber bullets).

- Later on the protests became increasingly violent. Civilians attacked and killed soldiers and set tanks on fire. Having no riot police, the government sent in the military.

- Rather than "tanks rolling over people" and "soldiers firing into crowds", I believe the militarily primary tried to disperse the crowds rather than attacking them. But in some places fights still broke out and people (from both sides) were killed.

The documentary shows that some of the protest leaders were pretty disingenuous, undemocratic even (despite calling for democracy).

The person that Daniel Dumbrill interviewed corroborates the naitivity of many protesters back then.

Re:What Does Evergrande Meltdown Mean for China? by FooBarWidget on Tuesday September 28, 2021 @02:26AM (#28679876)
Glad to see that you're genuinely interested in this topic! I'll also take a look at your articles.

I think "least-illegitimate" is key here. There is a philosophy that states that only the actually available options matter, not the theoretically ideal options that never were available in the first place.

This ties in with what you said about the CCP taking their ruling position by force. Historically speaking, how the CCP got into power (and how they are composed) is as close to democracy as you get, especially considering the available options.

The CCP got into power after the Chinese civil war of 1927-1949. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in the early 20th century, the KMT (Nationalist Party) got into power. But they were both corrupt and incompetent, and their loyalists consisted mostly of the tiny elite, so people revolted. The vast majority of the (poor and rural) population supported the communists. So it's not so much that the CCP took their position by force: they got into their position because they had the overwhelming support of the populace.

There were no further options other than Qing (weak, corrupt, incompetent), KMT (slightly less weak, still corrupt & incompetent), the various warlords because China fractured into pieces (each one corrupt and brutal) and the CCP (weak but got support of the majority). The CCP was regarded as the least corrupt because it was the most grass-roots movement. It was a peasant army.

Daniel Dumbrill, a Canadian citizen journalist vlogger that lives in Shenzhen, made a video in which he analyzes the CCP's history: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKxQDezR7Bg His source is the lecture "From Yao to Mao" by history professor Kenneth James Hammond, New Mexico State University. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VMEFNcbR0o&t=8m30s

My father-in-law explained it to me like this: 200 years ago, people were at the mercy of an emperor, who ruled by hereditary monarchy. 150 years ago, people were at the mercy of foreign imperialists, who exploited China for their own benefit. Today, the CCP rules, but the CCP consists of normal people and not a dynasty or foreigners, and therefore we have democracy.

That last sentence deserves more explanation. The CCP has 95 million members. That's about 5% of the population. This scale means that — even outside the NPC framework — there is a certain amount of people's representation just through party membership. Most party members are normal people who have a normal job outside party membership. For example teacher, factory worker, doctor. Pretty much everybody has a relative that's a party member. Party members are expected to work for the greater good. During the COVID epidemic in 2020, many frontline workers were party members. Not few of them either got sick or died.

The CCP just can't be compared to parties in western systems, it's conceptually very different. I think the name "party" is a misnomer: it's more like the fabric of the entire society. You say that it's necessary to make a distinction between people and government. But in the Chinese case, just by the sheer size of party membership, this distinction is truly very difficult to determine.

---

Regarding your question about whether people know about Tiananmen and what they think: I have a radical statement to make.

The 1989 Tiananmen protests succeeded.

Not in the sense of overthrowing the government, but in the sense that the government realized that something big was going on and that people were unhappy. In response, they accelerated economic reforms and got more serious about improving people's lives. That succeeded.

This ties in a bit with what I previously said about "censorship doesn't mean that the government won't deliver". I've heard somebody explain censorship of 1989 as follows: the government is ashamed of themselves and that's why they'd rather not talk about it. But they'd still quietly do their job and address the grievances.

The Tiananmen event isn't talked about much in Chinese society. That's because, in contrast to the west, it's not known as a big scandal. A lot of the protesters have moved on, exactly because it succeeded per my above definition. Some of them regretted taking part and thought they were too naive. Nowadays, the location of Tiananmen is a popular tourist spot. People don't primarily associate the location with the 1989 event.

And the reason why it's not a big scandal is because it wasn't a massacre. There were fights yes, there were people that got injured or died yes, but it wasn't "tanks rolling over people" and "soldiers firing into crowds".

You know the famous Tank Man photo, right? Western mainstream media usually only shows that photo, or a short clip, with the implication that the man died because he was ran over. Well here's the full video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qq8zFLIftGk The man was never run over! The tank was trying to avoid him. The man even climbed on the tank, had a conversation with the soldier, and then the man left. Nothing happened to him. Imagine doing the same thing in a western country: you'd be shot before you even approach the tank.

This is such a huge contrast with how western mainstream media characterizes 1989, that I question their entire narrative. Leaked cables confirm that there was no massacre in the sense of the mainstream characterization of the event: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8555142... There were still people killed outside the square. But it looked more like a riot that got out of hand, rather than "government one-sidedly massacres innocent people". For example, prior to the crackdown, people attacked and lynched soldiers. There are photos of burned tanks and burned soldiers.

This documentary analyzes the mainstream reporting of the event and critizes how it's characterized. The interesting thing is that his critique is based solely on western sources. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idv8Ne0xeTo

When I look at this documentary, I see that there was a lot of disingenuity in the protests — many protesters didn't know what they were doing and what they were asking, and blindly followed idealistic talking points with no regard for practical concerns, which is why from time to time I hear stories about former protesters being ashamed of how naive they were. It also looked like that the government exercised restraint as much as they could and knew how to, back at the time. The protests raged on for many days but got increasingly tense. The government tried multiple times to cool down the protesters.

Daniel Dumbrill interviewed a former Tiananmen protester. This is also a very interesting conversation. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eh2gLRUC6hc