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Re:FreeBSD SSH Hardening by Panino on Wednesday September 15, 2021 @01:57PM (#28542259)
Note that the above post-quantum key exchange method was removed in OpenSSH 8.5 (released March 3, 2021) in favor of a newer one:

[email protected]

So if you add the previous one to your server config, sshd may fail to start after upgrading to 8.5 or newer (8.7 is the most recent release).

I started using [email protected] about two years ago, and the new one when OpenSSH 8.5 came out. They've both worked flawlessly for me. Thank you to TinySSH and OpenSSH, and of course cryptographers, for making this possible.

Re:FreeBSD SSH Hardening by chasil on Wednesday September 15, 2021 @07:02PM (#28545566)
I actually filed the github request for Jan Mojžíš to update TinySSH with the new KEX.

I run tinysshd on some RedHat 5 servers, and I rely upon the latest post-quantum exchange. I also jack all my putty users into it with an agent, and I don't assign them passwords.

It would be nice if I was allowed to upgrade from RedHat 5, but I am not.

Re:FreeBSD SSH Hardening by BelenusMordred on Thursday September 16, 2021 @10:10AM (#28552023)
Thanks for the update, guessing this is the round 2 submission?

Despite being sidelined in NIST's post quantum standardisation project it's interesting to see their Streamlined NTRU Prime algorithm still being the main real world adoption out there right now. I'd be interested if anyone knows of a more utilised post-quantum algo irl.

Re:FreeBSD SSH Hardening by newman314 on Thursday September 16, 2021 @04:07PM (#28556802)
Do you compile your own OpenSSH? From what I can tell, the distributions have not really caught up yet.

Bullseye is still on 8.4. OpenSSH on Windows appears to be 8.1.