Most premeditated murder is perpetrated by someone very familiar with the victims.
The device is configured to 1) detect when you're there, then 2) try to guess your serial number every second you're within range, then 3) kills you.
Better yet, just get the serial number.
If the attacker then retrieves the device (so it doesn't fall into the hands of law enforcement), there would be absolutely no way to prove he killed you.
Put yourselves in the shoes of the prosecutor. How are you going to explain all this to the jury? In how many ways will the defense be able to attack the delicate task of explaining the technical details?
Obviously, this is an incredibly unlikely sequence of events. Nevertheless it IS possible, which is very irresponsible of the medical industry.
The "alibi machine" aspect of this scenario actually makes it more likely.
-- He is standing next to the victim.
-- He has a hammer. - Makes it look like a medical emergency
- Doesn't splatter you with bodily fluids
- Can be executed in a way that gives you an alibiA critical insulin overdose with the pump log full of remote access entries will look like murder.
Anyway, dropping poison in their drink while they're in the bathroom is easier, cheaper, more practical and gives the same "benefits".
I am not actually afraid that people are going to start doing this, however such flaws and failures in security thinking are systemic. Bad security is not limited to insulin pumps, but insulin pumps are a great way of getting the publics attention and (hopefully) getting programmers to consider the impact their laziness could have on the world.
If you want to kill someone, there are considerably cheaper options available at your local big-box store's home and garden center.
Seriously, though, I do agree with your concern for systemic problems in security thinking. Given the vastly more concentrated effort required, I don't think it's a problem that one could theoretically kill with GNU Radio and a laptop, versus any of the hundreds of tools more readily repurposed as a murder weapon, but such exploits are best addressed while they are unfeasable.
As the potential cost of attempting murder involves the risk of getting caught, it's entirely reasonable to expect murderers to go to great lengths to conceal their actions, even if in involves highly technical means. If such highly technical means are actually inexpensive and widely available, then this raises the level of concern with regards to the cost/benefit analyses.
In short:
Cost factors "pro" murder through wireless control of medical equipment
- getting caught is very expensive, so obscure and
invisible methods are attractive.
- time and materials costs are low for a suitable expert
- the method enables an alibi
Right now, a hacker can kill a specific person, within 30 days, given the following assumptions:
So, given those assumptions, here's a scary scenario: Let's say a hacker wants to kill you, and knows where you live. He builds a transmitter and plants it next to your house, for example behind your air conditioner. The device is configured to 1) detect when you're there, then 2) try to guess your serial number every second you're within range, then 3) kills you.If the attacker then retrieves the device (so it doesn't fall into the hands of law enforcement), there would be absolutely no way to prove he killed you.
Obviously, this is an incredibly unlikely sequence of events. Nevertheless it IS possible, which is very irresponsible of the medical industry.