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Re:Podman: A tool for managing OCI containers and pods by phire on Thursday September 02, 2021 @06:51PM (#28398373)
Shouldn't the best security come from using Rootless podman, but configuring SE Linux to prevent all other binaries from using unprivileged namespacing?

The concern isn't that podman itself might use that extra attack surface (because, you give podman so much more rights by making it setuid root), but that other untrusted binaries (like a virus) might use unpriviledged namespaces to exploit the kernel.

TBH, by the time you are worrying about privilege escalation from userspace threats on a typical single-user linux machine, you have already lost.

A smart threat will just modify your $PATH or bash aliases to replace su and sudo with wrappers that execute their own commands the next time you use su/sudo to do something legitimate.

Re:Podman: A tool for managing OCI containers and pods by sigotirandolas on Thursday September 02, 2021 @11:45PM (#28400194)
I’m not too knowledgeable about SELinux, but Podman itself can create unsafe (privileged, etc.) containers, so I don’t think naively restricting user namespaces to Podman is going to help, exploits could just create the namespaces through Podman instead of doing it themselves.

BTW, if I remember correctly Podman isn’t setuid root except some very small helper binaries, almost all of the process of creating the container can be done without root privileges.