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Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by gorgoiler on Monday August 23, 2021 @12:45AM (#28272402)
Out of interest, were you arrested?

As part of a duress protocol — where your extortioner is likely observing you — law enforcement would be required to go through the motions of arresting you and taking you offsite. You can expect to be held for X hours regardless of whether they believed you had simply made a mistake.

Long and unavoidable administrative delays make it much harder for villains to subvert protocols. See also time-delay bank vaults and mandatory two-week vacations for pension fund managers, where they are locked out of corpnet.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by oasisbob on Monday August 23, 2021 @03:41AM (#28273215)
No arrests. False alarms on silent alarm systems are common. Other factors made it clear that a real threat was unlikely.

All orgs should consider locking out all employees for at least one uninterrupted week a year. Very easy way to shake out all sorts of problems.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by matrixagent on Monday August 23, 2021 @06:08AM (#28273930)
> All orgs should consider locking out all employees for at least one uninterrupted week a year. Very easy way to shake out all sorts of problems.

Could you give some examples?

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by solatic on Monday August 23, 2021 @06:30AM (#28274032)
Mostly cases where businesses rely on individuals instead of process.

As a simple example, it's very easy, when starting a company, to issue personalized email addresses to early employees and then people communicate using those email addresses. It's perfectly fine to email the CTO at [email protected], because everyone knows everyone else and it works.

As you grow large, it becomes important for people to address roles rather than individuals. This way, if people leave their role, they can (semi-transparently) be replaced by someone else taking that role who will then continue to receive all of the same emails, be able to respond to them, etc. So then it becomes important to have e.g. a [email protected] address. When the CTO takes a vacation, their email gets routed to someone taking over their duties, you don't need to communicate to everyone to start emailing [email protected] instead.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by stevenwliao on Wednesday August 25, 2021 @02:12PM (#28304914)
This isn't how any of my workplaces have worked. When someone leaves, they or their boss sends an email announcing the role changes. Which companies practice the role@ method?
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by matrixagent on Monday August 23, 2021 @06:39AM (#28274072)
Thanks, that's a great example. I've actually encountered this exact thing at my current employer as well.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by 35fbe7d3d5b9 on Monday August 23, 2021 @10:41AM (#28276487)
As JulianMorrison notes, this is common in finance. The FDIC strongly recommends that banks enforce this[1] – you can't cook the books when you have no access to the systems.

But sometimes it's not just about cooking the books: the last "SSL cert expiration" fire I lived through happened because the person who had credentials to Digicert had to take sick leave. It was never a documented/defined process because "just flip Tim an email" was always sufficient, Tim didn't mind doing the work, and Tim didn't like going on vacation.

Two week lockouts mean there's no chance of shadow IT/back channel work happening, and forces you to document your processes.

[1]: https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/1995...

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by matrixagent on Monday August 23, 2021 @03:33PM (#28280842)
Thank you, that’s another good example, to which I wish I could relate less. ;)
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by JulianMorrison on Monday August 23, 2021 @06:29AM (#28274024)
IIRC, over here, banks are required to give employees at least one two-week contiguous block of leave, during which they can't get into the office, use work systems, or log in remotely. The idea being that oh-so-clever scams generally require the operator to be there keeping all the balls in the air, and locking them out will reveal their tricks.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by oofoe on Monday August 23, 2021 @11:13AM (#28277051)
My old company locked us out several years ago for a period of time that continues to be uninterrupted.

It certainly did shake out lots of problems...

(My point is that after having had that happen to me, if it EVER happens again and isn't cleared up within minutes, the sonic boom you hear will be my tactical resume deployment. I dismissed the warning signs as "minor glitches". Never again. However, if it is something planned and I agreed to it beforehand, I guess that's OK. On second reading, you might have been describing something like that.)

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by pyuser583 on Monday August 23, 2021 @04:06AM (#28273355)
Is it legal for them to arrest you simply to keep up the appearance? You haven’t done anything illegal.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by inglor on Monday August 23, 2021 @04:12AM (#28273386)
Not from the US, but here at a bank I worked with: If you trigger the silent alarm they'd have reason to suspect you are threatened and would take you to custody to make sure you are safe and release you once it's sorted out (probably an hour or so).
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by pyuser583 on Monday August 23, 2021 @04:19AM (#28273421)
That makes sense. Sorting things out takes time. But trying to create an illusion that no alarm was triggered to prevent criminals from gaining knowledge: not a reason to imprison an innocent person.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by nextlevelwizard on Monday August 23, 2021 @04:25AM (#28273458)
>imprison an innocent person.

Kind a hard word to use for an arrest. In many places police can arrest you for some period if they suspect you have committed a crime. This is no different. No need for sensational language.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by pyuser583 on Monday August 23, 2021 @04:39AM (#28273540)
In the US they can’t do anything unless they have “probable cause” you committed a crime. That’s broad, but it excludes “this guy pushed the number 6 three times in a row.”

And “imprison” and “arrest” are pretty darn close. In the US, when you are arrested, you are usually searched, fingerprinted, and a mugshot is taken.

The mugshot can become a public record. There are websites that match mugshots to names, and make money by being paid to take mugshots down.

Nobody wants the google result for their name to be a mugshot.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by nextlevelwizard on Monday August 23, 2021 @05:52AM (#28273862)
Probable cause isn't "pushed button multiple times" it is "silent alarm was triggered and this guy is on the only guy in the building".

If US is doing stupid shit then US is doing stupid shit. What else can we expect a third world country to do? In civilized world you are processed yes, but since you are just arrested and not accused you will just be held until the pre-investigation has concluded

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by inglor on Monday August 23, 2021 @11:59AM (#28277870)
This thread is long dead and off the frontpage - and this likely won't be seen by anyone (or even you nextlevelwizard) but here goes.

> What else can we expect a third world country to do?

We can criticise the largest economy in the world as much as we want inside a browser developed mostly in the US on infrastructure (the internet) whose large parts were developed in the US talking on a website created and owned by a US based company investing capital in one of the largest tech markets in the world (the valley).

That said - the fact they have police/healthcare/tuition problems does not in fact make it a third-world county.

A developing country ("third world") is typically one with low human development index (HDI) (the US is "very high"). Low economic output (the US is the largest economy) etc.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by jaywalk on Monday August 23, 2021 @10:41AM (#28276476)
In the US, what you're talking about is referred to as "detainment" which is very different from an arrest. I think that's where a lot of the confusion is coming from.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by johnmaguire on Monday August 23, 2021 @08:57AM (#28275027)
In the US, they cannot arrest you without probable cause. They can however detain you while they figure out what's going on.

Imprisoning is a much later step after being arrested. When you're arrested you may end up in a holding cell, or you may not.

Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by nonameiguess on Monday August 23, 2021 @11:37AM (#28277484)
People can be taken into protective custody without any suspicion they committed a crime, though typically this is mostly done with children and they're taken to foster care, not county detention. It has been used in the past to protect people from getting lynched after being publicly accused of a crime even if the police don't suspect them, and is used to protect confidential informants by arresting them along with everyone else just to keep up appearances, though in this case they usually agree to it in advance.
Re:PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations by nuvious on Tuesday August 24, 2021 @01:04AM (#28285285)
There's 'arrested' and 'detained'. In the US police can detain anyone for up to 48 hours (72 hours if it's a weekend or long holiday). If they don't file charges by then they have to release you.

For a silent/duress alarm it's easy to cross reference the person at the door with a list of personnel authorized to be in the facility. Security in a scenario like that would normally ask for an ID, radio it back to their security office to validate the person is on the access list for that office/building/facility/etc and then do a quick walk-around.