Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model

Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by reacharavindh on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @08:11AM (#28220079)

I admit that I have not done enough research to have a strong opinion on this, but why is Apple taking this on themselves? As far as I can see, this outrage is because of "scanning on iPhone" that is wildly out of user's control. Why can't Apple be like others and say we scan the shit out of what you upload to iCloud(and it is in our Terms and Conditions to use iCloud)?

Almost all tech people know that iCloud (or its backups) are not encrypted, so they can decrypt it as they wish.. and those among us that are privacy conscious can comfortable turn iCloud OFF(or not sign up for one) and use the iPhone as a simple private device?

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by helen___keller on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @09:19AM (#28220590)

My understanding is that iCloud reports orders of magnitudes less CSAM than other cloud services at a similar scale. My guess is that apple wanted a way to report the CSAM they are currently storing without having to decrypt/inspect every person's personal data (which necessarily opens vectors for e.g. rogue employees doing bad things with people's personal data)

Hence why this approach was stated as a privacy win by Apple. They catch the CSAM and they don't have to look at your photos stored online.

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by cyanite on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @04:29PM (#28226675)

Yes, and if you read (and understand) the technical implementation, it certainly does offer more privacy. But yeah for people who don’t, it often seems much worse.

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by jefftk on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @08:19AM (#28220112)

The speculation that I've seen here is that Apple is rolling this out ahead of a future announcement that iCloud uploads will be encrypted.

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by bitneuker on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @09:09AM (#28220509)

Are they not? I would've thought that with Apple advertising privacy and security they would at least encrypt iCloud uploads.

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by reacharavindh on Thursday August 19, 2021 @05:44AM (#28231964)

Apple has the decryption keys to iCloud... It is one of those things that many people assume the other way given Apple's marketing and PR stands.

I for one am aware of this with iCloud and am still using iCloud for convenience (and by choice). If I were in need of better privacy, I can always use the iPhone without iCloud, and it will work. After this "in phone" watchdog implementation, that will not be the case. I will assume that Apple is constantly watching all my unencrypted content in the worst case, on behalf of state actors and intelligence agencies.

We have seen Apple give in to the Chinese government spying because it is the law there. US government could easily ask for this and also apply a gag order preventing Apple from being able to tell the user. The best situation is to lack such a tool.

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by davidcbc on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @09:42AM (#28220807)

iCloud uploads are encrypted in transit and on their servers, but they are not E2E encrypted. Apple has the decryption keys

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by zug_zug on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @09:18AM (#28220579)

If so they flubbed it.

If they are e2e encrypted they can't be distributed/shared without giving a key of some sort. Why not just scan them at time of distribution, and treat undistributed files the same as any local hard-drive (i.e. not their problem).

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Re:Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model by cyanite on Wednesday August 18, 2021 @04:30PM (#28226685)

This system could still work with an e2e encrypted cloud library. However, it’s currently not e2e.

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